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ABSTRACT 
Cyberattacks by non-state actors have evolved with the speed of technology, 
leaving governments largely powerless to address emerging threats, partly due to the lack 
of legal options to dissuade or deter malicious non-state actors. To adequately address the 
threat, the international community must form legally binding mechanisms to pursue 
non-state actors similar to the way the world rethought terrorism after 9/11. This thesis 
rejects a proposed dispute-mitigation recommendation now under consideration by 
international negotiators—the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 
leveraging the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime as its framework—and explores an 
alternative approach for the international governance of the cyber domain, with due 
mechanisms established to address the ongoing threat of malicious non-state actors. 
Numerous stakeholders influence cyber strategies in the U.S. and internationally; 
therefore, a one-system entity is an ineffective regulatory mechanism. Rather, it should 
be multi-pronged, multilateral, and comprise a unified approach that includes the UN, 
NATO, INTERPOL, as well as sanctioned unilateral state processes to achieve optimal 
outcomes. The Paris Climate Agreement should be referenced as a model for success in 
garnering support for this governance initiative, utilizing the UN to define the space and 
develop a clear, well-defined framework leveraging the Budapest Convention and 
the Tallinn Manual 2.0 encapsulated in an amendable treaty. 
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The 21st century digital “Information Age” is characterized by dynamism, 
innovation, and new technological capabilities. The cyber domain provides limitless 
technological capabilities to improve living in the modern world. As technological 
capabilities expand to meet the needs of an information-driven society, it is critical that the 
international community create an international mechanism for effective cyber-governance 
to mitigate vulnerabilities and respond to threats that impact national and international 
security.  
Cyber activities are transnational, evolve rapidly, and affect the international 
community’s critical infrastructure, states, cities, and localities. Most cyber activities are 
legitimate; they respond to people’s demands, promote economic growth, and support 
quality of life for many people around the world. Nation-state cyber actors are at the 
forefront of cyber discussions among cyber-centric international governments, the private 
sector, and academia. A gap, however, pertains to information about non-state actors 
regarding regulation, compliance, and enforcement mechanisms. The Tallinn Manuals’ 
International Group of Experts (IGE) were unanimous in their estimations that cyber 
activities do not exist in a normative void and that existing international law applies to 
cyber operations. Cyber governance cannot be solely based on the concept of sovereignty, 
regulated by nation-states. Formal international governing mechanisms are critical for 
global understanding of cyberspace boundaries and a unified response to resolve cyber 
disputes. There are very few treaties for cyber activities and those that do exist are of 
limited scope and applicability. Efforts need to involve coordinated partnerships that span 
federal, state, and local levels in the United States; internationally; in the private sector; 
and with academic subject matter experts to develop and implement effective governance.  
During the April 2019 Atlantic Council’s Eighth Annual International Conference 
on Cyber Engagement (ICCE) in Washington, DC, a group of cyber experts discussed 
multi-disciplinary approaches to develop international collaboration and norms to act 
xvi 
against growing cyberattacks.1 David Koh, chief executive of Singapore’s Cyber Security 
Agency, advised of the need for a whole-of-government global engagement to develop a 
legal framework of measures and oversight; a “vibrant cybersecurity ecosystem.”2 
International order is necessary for the collective security of all nation-states.  
This thesis arose from Isaac “Ike” Barnes’s 2018 Center for Homeland Defense and 
Security (CHDS) thesis. As part of his holistic approach, Barnes discussed the need for a 
cyber dispute mitigation entity. He identified the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) as the entity 
together with the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime as the framework. Barnes’s 
designation of the CCDCOE as the governing body is based on the center’s history with 
cybersecurity; specifically its IGE, who interpreted and restated international law, 
contained within the Tallinn Manuals, as applied to the cyber domain. This thesis disputes 
his proposal and builds upon his effort by considering an alternative approach to 
international governance of non-state actors in the cyber domain. Numerous stakeholders 
influence cyber strategies in the United States and internationally; therefore, a one-system 
entity is an ineffective regulatory mechanism. Rather, an international cyber-governance 
mechanism should be a multi-pronged, multilateral, and unified approach to achieve the 
greatest success with concession by a majority of the international cyber community. 
This research explored the current cyber landscape including existing international 
law, cyber rules of engagement (ROE), and regulatory mechanisms. Then, this study 
examined Barnes’s recommended future course of study for a mitigation entity in the 
context of non-state cyber activities. Subject matter analysis from multiple datasets 
provided insight into the existence, enforcement, and effectiveness of international law 
application to the cyber domain, as well as missing pieces in cyber international 
governance.  
 
1 Catherine Lotrionte, “Atlantic Council Eighth Annual International Conference on Cyber 
Engagement (ICCE): Introductory Remarks” (symposium, G.W. Lisner Auditorium, George Washington 
University, Washington, DC, April 22, 2019), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/icce. 
2 David Koh, “Atlantic Council Eighth Annual International Conference on Cyber Engagement 
(ICCE): Keynote Address” (symposium, G.W. Lisner Auditorium, George Washington University, 
Washington, DC, April 22, 2019), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/icce. 
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After reviewing Barnes’s mitigation proposal, the researcher identified flaws and 
proposed an alternative multi-pronged regulatory mechanism solution. Numerous 
stakeholders influence cyber strategies in the United States and internationally; therefore, 
a one-system entity is an ineffective regulatory mechanism. Rather, it should be a multi-
pronged, multilateral, and unified approach to achieve the greatest success, with concession 
by a majority of the international cyber community. The multi-pronged approach includes 
NATO, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), and unilateral 
processes such as the Paris Climate Agreement and the United Nations (UN). The Paris 
Climate Agreement should be referenced as a model for success in garnering support for 
this major global cyber initiative, and the UN should delineate the space and develop a 
clear, well-defined framework using both the Budapest Convention and the Tallinn Manual 
2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (Tallinn Manual 2.0) 
encapsulated in an amendable treaty. In consideration of cyberspace’s rapid evolution and 
key players, the Tallinn 2.0 restatements of law should be expanded to include non-state 
activity, either through attribution or forensic analysis to associate them with a state, for 
international law application. Similar to the post–World War II era establishment of 
international laws and norms governing conflicts between states, the United States should 
guide conversations to develop recommended courses of action to apply law to cyberspace, 
explore threats, understand their drivers and challenges, determine the best courses of 
action for regulatory measures and compliance, and offer suggestions for cyber-specific 
regulatory measures. Likewise, this thesis also recommends future areas of study to explore 
compliance, enforcement, and the United States’ role in such an international cyber 
governance mechanism. 
The United States is a key player in the cyber domain and needs to fully engage in 
governance discussions and development to ensure inclusion, intelligence and information 
sharing, transparency, and accountability. A key takeaway and lesson learned from the 
research is that the U.S. government must continue to build and improve cooperation with 
national and international partners, as the issue will not be resolved unilaterally. An 
international governing mechanism will impact global security, and concurrently, U.S. 
homeland security by providing clarity on cyber rules and regulation measures for 
xviii 
mitigation and response to malign cyber actions by non-state actors. A secure border is a 
multilateral, shared effort; difficulties arise when the borders are complex and activity 
frequently travels across state borders. The issue will not be solved quickly, yet the 
discussions must continue at full speed to head toward a resolution before cyberspace 
expands beyond our ability to regulate it. An effective multi-pronged international 
governance approach will be a culmination of effective coordinated partnerships and 
collaborative efforts to provide critical oversight and response to criminal and terrorist 
activity within the rapidly expanding and evolving cyber problem space. A governance 
mechanism will provide homeland security benefits for the United States via operational 
approaches, augmented responses to criminal activity, increased resources for cyber 
security resilience, and possible deterrence. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The 21st century “Information Age” is characterized by dynamism, innovation, and 
new technological capabilities. The cyber domain provides limitless technological 
capabilities to improve living in the modern world. During a May 29, 2009, speech, 
President Barack Obama stated, “This world—cyberspace—is a world that we depend on 
every single day … [it] has made us more interconnected than at any time in human 
history.”1 
As technological capabilities expand to meet the needs of an information-driven 
society, it is critical that the international community create an international mechanism 
for effective cyber governance to mitigate vulnerabilities and respond to threats that impact 
national and international security. Advancement of information technologies, global 
proliferation of affordable internet access, and the subsequent weaponization of these 
platforms has evolved into a credible threat to international and U.S. homeland security. 
The United States remains the preeminent target for malicious cyber activity, ranging from 
cyber-enabled economic espionage to cyberattacks targeting government and private sector 
business interests. Recently, Richard Clarke stated that “very little has been done in the last 
10 years to protect major systems (critical infrastructure) in the United States … to protect 
our own military weapons systems … to secure the government.”2 We have seen firsthand 
the government’s lack of cyber security with the 2015 Office of Personnel Management 
(OPM) incidents when background investigation records and personal data of 4.2 million 
employees were stolen.3 There were 30,899 information-security incidents reported by the 
federal government in 2016, 16 of which were considered major incidents; in 2017, 21 
 
1 Barack Obama, Securing U.S. Cyber Infrastructure (Washington, DC: American Rhetoric Online 
Speech Bank, 2009). 
2 A. J.Vicens, “The U.S. Government Has Done ‘Almost Nothing’ to Stop Cyber Attacks,” 
MotherJones, July16, 2019, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/07/the-us-government-has-done-
almost-nothing-to-stop-cyber-attacks/. 
3 “Cybersecurity Resource Center, What Happened,” Office of Personnel Management, accessed July 
28, 2019. https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/; Vicens. 
2 
agencies continued to show vulnerabilities in five major areas of concern.4 Aligning cyber 
operations with national and international policies is imperative to decision-making. A shift 
toward an international collaborative response to apply international laws and develop 
cyber norms presents numerous potential challenges, especially in the following areas: 
reaching consensus, securing adherence from countries with differing mindsets about the 
cyber environment, complying, and enforcing such agreements.  
Internet use has grown exponentially over the years, bringing with it greater 
vulnerability to criminal activity. Cyberspace is the new battlefield, with state-sponsored 
cyberattacks resulting in devastating effects to a wide range of entities, from credit 
company data breaches to the Sony release of confidential data. State-sponsored 
cyberattacks have crippled companies, affected the economy, and jeopardized the security 
and privacy of companies and individuals. WannaCry, a devastating May 2017 
ransomware attack linked to the North Korean state-sponsored cybercriminal organization, 
Lazarus Group, exploited Microsoft Windows vulnerabilities discovered—but not resolved 
in a timely way—by the National Security Agency (NSA).5 In 2017, Cybersecurity Ventures 
reported the average cost of a single ransomware attack is $5 million, including system 
downtime, information technology (IT) and user productivity losses, with cybercrime costs 
expected to hit $6 trillion annually by 2021.6 The chaos and economic losses resulting from 
these recent ransomware attacks have highlighted the need for an operational transformation 
focused on cyber deterrence.  
State actors—Russia, North Korea, China, Iran—are at the forefront of cyber 
discussions among cyber-centric international governments, the private sector, and 
academia. A gap, however, pertains to information about non-state actors and proxy state 
actors regarding regulation, compliance, and enforcement mechanisms. Both types of 
 
4 Riley Walters, “Federal Cyber Breaches in 2017,” The Heritage Foundation, January 3, 2018, 
https://www.heritage.org/cybersecurity/report/federal-cyber-breaches-2017. 
5 Josh Fruhlinger, “What Is WannaCry Ransomware, How Does It Infect, and Who Was 
Responsible?” CSO, accessed November 11, 2018, https://www.csoonline.com/article/3227906/
ransomware/what-is-wannacry-ransomware-how-does-it-infect-and-who-was-responsible.html.   
6 Steve Morgan, “Global Ransomware Damage Costs Predicted To Exceed $5 Billion In 2017,” 
Cybercrime Magazine, May 18, 2017. https://cybersecurityventures.com/ransomware-damage-report-2017-
5-billion/.  
3 
actors pose interesting cyber challenges because of the difficulties of attribution. For 
example, proxy state actors provide a distinct governance challenge because they are 
purportedly acting under the arm of a state actor, but the state actor refuses to acknowledge 
or admit ties to those actions. This arms-length relationship raises questions about how 
sanctions could be applied and to whom—an individual or a group? Similar to the post–
World War II era establishment of international laws and norms governing conflicts 
between states, the United States should guide conversations to develop recommended 
courses of action to apply law to cyberspace, explore each of those threats, understand their 
drivers and challenges, determine the best courses of action for regulatory measures and 
compliance, and offer suggestions for cyber-specific regulatory measures.  
The 2016 U.S. presidential election represented a watermark moment for the 
country as the first publicly exposed instance in which a foreign state actor, by leveraging 
information technologies, executed a complex information campaign and cyber operations 
at the local, state, and national levels to influence a U.S. election. While subsequent 
criminal investigations are ongoing, the ability to leverage the cyber domain as a tool to 
influence public opinion by exploiting public- and private-sector protected data through 
multiple delivery vehicles via the internet is a critical national security concern.  
On January 6, 2016, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence ODNI 
released a declassified report, stating that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and NSA have “high confidence” that Russian 
President Vladimir Putin ordered activities to influence the U.S. presidential election in 
order to “undermine public faith in the U.S. democratic process, denigrate [Hillary] 
Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency.”7 These activities were 
facilitated “by cyber-espionage and cyber-driven covert influence operations, conducted as 
 
7 Richard Burr, “Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” burr.senate.gov, July 3, 2018, 
https://www.burr.senate.gov/download/final-ssci-ica-assessment; Catherine A. Theohary and Cory Welt, 
“Russia and the U.S. Presidential Election,” Congressional Research Service, January 17, 2017. 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IN10635.pdf.  
4 
part of a broader ‘active measures’ campaign that included overt messaging through 
Russian-controlled propaganda platforms.”8  
Prior work by the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and interagency programs 
provided warnings of potential operations, but the scope of these cyberattacks is still not 
completely understood. What is clear is the need to address the threats that the cyber 
environment presents to U.S. interests in both the national and international arenas to 
successfully mitigate cyber vulnerabilities and secure the U.S. homeland. Cyber operations 
present a high-yield, low-cost option with deniability and entity-masking that will make 
future attacks against the United States by proxy state and non-state actors a viable option. 
Not all cyberattacks involve high-profile critical infrastructure targets; many attacks are 
executed on lightly defended targets of opportunity such as outdated security updates, 
incompetent or unknowing users who click on malicious links, or social engineering that 
can all be done through a simple phone call or by entering default passwords.9 An October 
2018 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report employed test teams to detect 
mission-critical vulnerabilities in weapons systems that were under development. Using 
basic, simple tools and techniques that require “little knowledge or expertise,” testers easily 
gained unauthorized, undetected access and control; one team indicated an administrative 
password was guessed in nine seconds.10 Although testing uncovers basic to moderate 
vulnerabilities, the majority of extensive, sophisticated vulnerabilities likely exist deeper 
under the surface, beyond current testing simulation (see Figure 1).11 
 
8 “Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” U.S. Senate, July 3, 2018, 
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/publications/committee-findings-2017-intelligence-community-
assessment. 
9 Alex Hern, “Cyber-Attacks and Hacking: What You Need To Know,” Guardian, November 1, 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/nov/01/cyber-attacks-hacking-philip-hammond-state-
cybercrime. 
10 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Weapons Systems Cybersecurity: DoD Just Beginning to 
Grapple with Scale of Vulnerabilities, GAO-19-128 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 
2018), 21. https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/694913.pdf.  
11 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 26.  
5 
 
Figure 1. Visual Depiction of Vulnerabilities Magnitude12  
As digital technologies enable businesses to become more adaptable and agile in 
the workplace, the potential increases for cybercriminals to gain access to information 
networks. In November 2014, the Guardians of the Peace (GOP) publicly brought North 
Korea into the cyber limelight when it hacked Sony in retaliation for a planned release—
later, canceled—of a comedy movie film centered on the assassination of a North Korean 
leader.13 According to Dmitri Alperovitch, cofounder of cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike, 
the Sony incident was “the first time a country has forced a target—through a 
cyberattack—to change its behavior against its will.”14 This incident crippled the entire 
corporate network, forcing business organizations to take cybercrime seriously. 
As the cyber battlespace evolves and expands, it will become a premier venue for 
unconventional warfare. The cyber domain is not a new area of operation; the U.S. Cyber 
Command was created over ten years ago in 2008 (fully operational in 2010) to lead and 
 
12 Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office. 
13 Zach Whittaker, “FBI Says North Korea Is ‘Responsible’ For Sony Hack, As White House Mulls 
Response,” ZDNet, December 19, 2014, https://www.zdnet.com/article/us-government-officially-blames-
north-korea-for-sony-hack/.  
14 Ellen Nakashima, “White House Says Sony Hack Is A Serious National Security Matter,” 




coordinate cyberspace planning and operations.15 The broad questions associated with how 
cyber fits within the constructs of international laws have been continually discussed within 
government, the private sector, and academic circles. Nations agree that these laws should 
apply to the cyber domain, but the question remains: how?  
During the Atlantic Council’s April 2019 Eighth Annual International Conference 
on Cyber Engagement (ICCE) in Washington, DC, a group of experts discussed multi-
disciplinary approaches to develop international collaboration and norms to act against 
growing cyberattacks.16 David Koh, chief executive of Singapore’s Cyber Security 
Agency, advised of the need for a whole-of-government global engagement to develop a 
legal framework of measures and oversight: a “vibrant cybersecurity ecosystem.”17 The 
borderless cyber environment requires a mutual effort to establish a rules-based 
cyberspace, similar to the UN Conventions on the Law of the Sea: a pivotal work that 
extended international law to the vast, 140 million square miles of ocean; established 
freedom-of-navigation rights; and created territorial sea boundaries, exclusive economic 
zones, and rules for extending continental shelf rights.18 International order is necessary 
for the collective security of all nation-states. The question is how does the international 
community effectively develop, fully adapt, and implement order within the cyber domain?  
Is it possible to govern a space that does not have tangible borders? This question 
has been explored and discussed throughout the international cyber community as 
activities—both innocent and nefarious—increase within the cybersphere. The 
international community concurs that international laws should apply to the cyber domain; 
the disagreements lie in how they should apply. The majority of research and discussions 
have focused on the application of international laws to state actors. This thesis takes it a 
 
15 “About History,” U.S. Cyber Command, accessed May 10, 2019, https://www.cybercom.mil/About/
History/. 
16 Catherine Lotrionte, “Atlantic Council Eighth Annual International Conference on Cyber 
Engagement (ICCE): Introductory Remarks” (symposium, G.W. Lisner Auditorium, George Washington 
University, Washington, DC, April 22, 2019), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/icce. 
17 David Koh, “Atlantic Council Eighth Annual International Conference on Cyber Engagement 
(ICCE): Keynote Address” (symposium, G.W. Lisner Auditorium, George Washington University, 
Washington, DC, April 22, 2019), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/icce. 
18 Koh. 
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step further, exploring the question: How could international laws apply to non-state actors 
within the cyber domain during peace-time operations?  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Is the NATO CCDCOE, using the Budapest Convention framework, the correct 
regulatory entity for international governance of non-state actors in the cyber domain? Is 
one governing entity sufficient or should there be a multipronged approach for dispute 
resolution? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A literature review on the application of international norms and law, including the 
Laws of War, jus ad bellum (law concerning use of force during war) and jus in bello (law 
concerning conduct during war), yields three main categories: existing international law 
and the Laws of War as they apply to the cyber domain, development of an entirely new 
and unique set of rules on cyberspace, and the establishment of a central international 
governing body to mitigate disputes.  
Sanctity exists within international law, as Madeleine Albright once revealed: it is 
a “body of norms made by states for states, and its content and application are almost 
always open to honest dispute.”19 An issue with international law, which will be 
encountered as the world tries to govern non-state and proxy state actors, is the lack of one 
power or governing body with the ultimate authority to interpret international law for 
everyone.20 Currently, each state has the right and obligation to interpret international law 
for itself.  
In 2011, the UN “Group of Governmental Experts” on cyber issues noted the “U.S. 
acceptance of the applicability of the [Laws of War]—jus ad bellum and jus in bello—to 
 
19 Lee Casey and David B. Rivkin, International Law and the Nation-State at the U.N.: A Guide for 
U.S. Policymakers, Heritage Foundation, August 18, 2016, 2. https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/
report/international-law-and-the-nation-state-the-un-guide-forus-policymakers. 
20 Casey and Rivkin. 
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activities in cyberspace.”21 This document furthered discussions of conventional legal 
applicability to the cyber domain but left open the question as to how these Laws of War 
and international laws should apply in the cyber domain, by which authority they should 
be governed, and what extra regulatory measures, if any, need to be emplaced.  
The cyber domain remains an area of uncertainty with regard to international 
regulation. U.S. Department of State Legal Advisor Harold Koh explained in his address 
to the 2012 U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) Inter-Agency Legal Conference that 
international law applies to the cyber domain and identified several unresolved future 
issues in cyberspace, such as the possible need to develop unique regulations.22 In his 2018 
thesis, Ike Barnes proposed NATO’s CCDCOE, which facilitated the Tallinn Manual 2.0 
on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (Tallinn 2.0), as an international 
governance framework to mitigate cyber disputes.23 Global engagements, including the 
2001 Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, have furthered discussions on the need for 
international governance; however, a consensus has not been reached as to composition or 
limitations of such a governing institution.24  
Establishing attribution is a critical step in cyber operations, one that is neither 
simple nor automated. Attribution is one of the challenges in determining whether an actor 
is a state, non-state, or a proxy state actor. Reviewing existing or proposed attribution 
processes remains outside the scope of this thesis. It will only be mentioned in context of 
a proposed international governance process once the cyber action is attributed based on 
cyber community attribution indicators such as tradecraft, infrastructure, malware, intent, 
 
21 “Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International 
Security,” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2011, https://www.un.org/disarmament/ict-
security/.  
22 Harold Honhgu Koh, “International Law in Cyberspace” (conference, USCYBERCOM Inter-
Agency Legal Conference, Ft. Mead, MD, Sept. 18, 2012) https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/
197924.htm. 
23 Isaac A. Barnes, “Implementation of Active Cyber Defense Measures by Private Entities: The Need 
for an International Body to Address Disputes” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2018), 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/61274/18Dec_Barnes_Isaac.pdf?sequence=
1&isAllowed=y. 
24 Elena Chernenko, Oleg Demidov, and Fyodor Lukyanov. “Increasing International Cooperation in 
Cybersecurity and Adapting Cyber Norms,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 23, 2018, 
https://www.cfr.org/report/increasing-international-cooperation-cybersecurity-and-adapting-cyber-norms. 
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and external source reporting.25 To effectively govern cyber activities and possibly levy 
sanctions or other remedies, the action needs to be attributed to the appropriate party or 
parties for proper routing within the governance process. Cyber activities by non-state 
actors have been multiplying over the last decade, thus driving the transformation of 
international debates and relationships. However, the U.S. National Intelligence Council 
in 2007 warned that very few standalone non-state actors exist; most are dependent upon—
in some manner—nation-states and lack autonomous latitude.26 Pure, independent non-
state freedom of movement is greater in weak or post-industrial states than in modernized 
states such as Russia and China, where the governments suppress independent actors and 
have their own powerful cyber entities capable of influencing global powers such as the 
United States. When determining attribution for the purpose of the international 
governance process, a key component will be factors that denote a non-state actor’s 
relationship to a nation-state, a distinguishing factor in the remedies stage.  
Another factor in determining culpability of non-state actors will be benign or non-
benign branding. Several variations of the “non-state actor” definition abound, but without 
consensus as to the composition of the category and who should or should not be branded. 
For instance, trade unions, religious organizations, communities, and academic institutions 
are sometimes included in the classification. The National Intelligence Council defines 
non-state actors as “non-sovereign entities that exercise significant economic, political, or 
social power and influence at a national, and in some cases international, level.”27 Benign 
non-state actors, such as most multi-national corporations, nongovernmental organizations 
(NGO), or highly-influential philanthropic individuals pose minimal threat to U.S. and 
international security. Due to the minimal threat, they are often overlooked in geopolitical 
discussions and will only be mentioned in this thesis for defining non-state actor categories. 
The specific non-state actors discussed in this thesis are the benign, truly non-state 
 
25 “A Guide to Cyber Attribution,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 3, September 14, 
2018. https://www.dni.gov/files/CTIIC/documents/ODNI_A_Guide_to_Cyber_Attribution.pdf. 
26 “Nonstate Actors: Impact on International Relations and Implications for the United States,” 
National Intelligence Council, 1, 2007. https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/nonstate_actors_2007.pdf 
27 National Intelligence Council, 2. 
10 
individuals and organizations with functions completely independent from national 
governments and nation-state entities.  
As the cyber domain continues to rapidly expand, so too will the cyber threats 
against the United States and international partners. The literature supports the notion that 
nation-states, notably China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, as well as malign non-state 
actors and proxies, increasingly use cyber as low-cost method for conducting transnational, 
global operations to advance their interests.28 It is imperative to continue driving the 
international governance discussion to formulate transnational preparedness, mitigation 
and response to a growing and potentially escalating cyber environment. In 2004, the 
United Nations (UN) recognized the need for a paradigm shift not only from an 
intergovernmental body to including civil society (non-state groups) engagement, but also 
stressed the importance of non-state actors in the global ecosystem, with the 
recommendation that the UN take a proactive approach in “bringing together all 
constituencies relevant to global issues, and galvanizing appropriate networks for effective 
results.”29 Prioritizing the cyber governance discussion with proposed responsibilities and 
roles, in whole or in part, for international organizations such as the UN advances this 
proactive approach.  
A main part of this thesis arose from a 2018 Center for Homeland Defense and 
Security (CHDS) thesis by Isaac “Ike” Barnes. It focused on the Active Cyber Defense 
Certainty (ACDC) Act, Cyber Diplomacy Act of 2017 (CDA), and the need to couple them 
along with the creation of a national Director of Cybersecurity position, similar to the 
Director of National Intelligence, to effectively transform the current passive cybersecurity 
posture to one focused on active defense. The ACDC Act, nicknamed the “Hack Back 
Bill,” is bipartisan U.S. legislation (H.R. 4036) proposed on October 13, 2017, to amend 
 
28 Daniel R. Coats, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence, January 29, 2019, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-
ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf; Koh, “International Law in Cyberspace;” National Intelligence Council, “Nonstate 
Actors”; Chernenko, Demidov, and Lukyanov, “Increasing International Cooperation in Cybersecurity and 
Adapting Cyber Norms.” 
29 “United Nations Urged to Pay More Heed to Role of ‘Non-State Actors’ in Approach to Global 
Problems,” United Nations, June 21, 2004, https://www.un.org/press/en/2004/sg2089.doc.htm. 
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the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act by limiting negative consequences for parties that 
engage in counterattack or defense measures to cyber intrusions, also dubbed “active 
defense.”30 The last action on the ACDC Act was on November 1, 2017, when it was 
referred by the Congressional Committee on the Judiciary to the Subcommittee on Crime, 
Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations. The CDA was introduced in September 
2017 (H.R. 3776), passed the House and passed to the Senate as CDA of 2018 in June 
2018. The bill proposed cyber policy promoting “an open, interoperable, reliable, 
unfettered, and secure Internet governed by a model that promotes human rights, 
democracy, and the rule of law, while respecting privacy and guarding against deception, 
fraud, and theft.”31 It also called for establishment of a Department of State Office of Cyber 
Issues, and encouraged the president of the United States to “enter into executive 
arrangements with foreign governments that support the cyberspace policy.”32 The CDA 
of 2019 (H.R. 739) expanded on CDA of 2018 to establish a Department of State Office of 
International Cyberspace Policy to implement the U.S. international cyber policy 
mentioned in CDA of 2018, serve as an advisor for cyber issues, lead cybersecurity 
diplomatic efforts, and direct the president to “devise a strategy related to U.S. engagement 
with foreign governments on international norms with respect to responsible state behavior 
in cyberspace.”33 The bill has been sitting with the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
for consideration since March 2019. Barnes’ approach considers the CDA a mechanism 
for U.S. companies’ behavior in cyberspace, supporting the use of active cyber defense. 
Rounding out this holistic approach, Barnes discussed the need for a dispute-
mitigation entity. He identified the NATO CCDCOE together with the Budapest 
Convention on Cybercrime to provide a framework and dispute resolution entity. Barnes’s 
designation of the CCDCOE as a governing body is based on Centre’s history with 
 
30 Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act, H.R. 4036, 115th Congress (2017-2018) 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/4036/text. 
31 Cyber Diplomacy Act of 2018, H.R. 3776, 115th Congress, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
congress/house-bill/3776. 
32 Cyber Diplomacy Act of 2018.  
33 Cyber Diplomacy Act of 2019, H.R.739, 116th Congress, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-
congress/house-bill/739.  
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cybersecurity: specifically, its international group of experts (IGE) who interpreted and 
restated international law as applied to the cyber domain. These restatements—black letter 
rules—are contained within Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Warfare (Tallinn) and Tallinn 2.0. Barnes’s argument is that by empowering the CCDCOE 
to mitigate cyber disputes, information-sharing will be easier while at the same time 
making it harder for “enemies to remain anonymous.”34 In addition to stating that the U.S. 
Executive Branch should work with international partners to determine the best active 
cyber defense measures in accordance with the ACDC Act, he states the Executive Branch 
also has an integral role in modifying the NATO charter to enable and allow for the 
CCDCOE to continue its Tallinn 2.0 legal analysis and to develop into a governance body 
responsible for dispute mitigation and resolution.35 
This thesis leverages the following future areas of study that Barnes recommended, 
taking them a step further to focus on purely non-state actors:  
• What is the process flow between nations to resolve disputes pertaining to 
non-state actors?  
• “How will the CCDCOE resolve the inevitable disputes” regarding non-
state actors/malign acts? 
• “What is the mechanism to bring the disputes before the CCDCOE?” 
• Is the CCDCOE the correct entity for disputes? If not, what are other 
options? Is it a singular body or a network of governing bodies to 
effectively regulate the cyberspace pertaining to non-state actors? 
• Develop procedures to employ recommendations from his thesis and this 
research. 
 
34 Barnes, “Implementation of Active Cyber Defense Measures by Private Entities,” 57. 
35 Barnes, 53. 
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D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis discusses the current cyber landscape and examines existing 
international law and regulatory mechanisms as they apply to the cyber domain, generally, 
and to non-state actors, specifically. The thesis examined several of Barnes’s future course 
of study in the context of non-state cyber activities. Based on concurrence or disapproval 
of his suggestions, it offers alternative solutions for regulatory mechanisms or processes. 
Likewise, it recommends future areas of study to explore additional remedies, including 
sanctions and other regulatory measures, if any, that may need to be created to address 
areas not covered by existing laws. Subject matter analysis from multiple datasets provided 
insight into the existence, enforcement, and effectiveness of international law application 
to the cyber domain, as well as missing pieces in cyber international governance. This 
research examined cyber rules of engagement (ROE), restatement of international law as 
they pertain to the cyber domain, frameworks, and international bodies with cyber 
influence. 
Once it was understood how international laws could be applied to the cyber 
domain, the next step examined the types of processes that could be developed to regulate 
non-state actors as well as how they could be applied and by what body or bodies. This 
research focused attention on Barnes’s proposed framework, the Budapest Convention, and 
NATO’s CCDCOE as well as alternative options for the composition and location of a 
dispute resolution solution. The research studied the pros and cons of a possible single 
solution governance or a combination of entities through a multi-pronged approach. The 
solutions are identified, examined, and assessed through gap and process analyses based 
on binary adaptability within existing legal frameworks, authorities, governance, and 
enforcement challenges to determine current status, deficiencies, and actions required to 
move forward and remedy the deficiencies.  
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II. CYBER THREATS AND POLICY RESPONSES 
This chapter provides the reader with an understanding of the current layout of 
cyberspace. First, it reflects on the current power competition between the key players in 
today’s cyberspace—China, Russia, North Korea, and the United States. Next, the chapter 
lays out significant policy developments that helped shape the United States response to its 
main adversaries. Finally, it paints a picture of the three main categories of actors—state, 
non-state, and proxy state actors—in the cyber domain, discussing each role with examples. 
Although the thesis focuses on non-state actors, it is essential to have a holistic picture and 
situational awareness of the problem area to understand the key players and their roles in 
cyberspace.  
A. POWER COMPETITION WITH CHINA, RUSSIA AND NORTH KOREA 
The 2018 Department of Defense (DOD) Cyber Strategy acknowledges that the 
United States is engaged in long-term strategic cyber competition with Russia and China 
as well as facing continuous malicious cyber threats from North Korea that pose serious 
risks to our nation as well as our allies and partners.36 The strategy stresses the importance 
of defending forward—taking preemptive, active rather than reactive, assertive operations 
to degrade adversarial cyber activities as close to the source as possible before reaching 
U.S. assets, building a skilled cyber force, securing critical information systems and 
infrastructure, and engaging with partners to protect against malicious cyber activity. 
1. China 
China’s sophisticated technological capability and power drive gives the country 
an advantage as one of the top major threats in the cyber domain. President Xi Jinping has 
stated his desires to turn China in a “cyber-superpower,” and it has been ramping up its 
 




efforts to achieve this goal.37 With a newly established Cyberspace Administration of 
China and four cyber-focused national priorities, China and the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) are determined to increase their cyber forces and network defenses while also 
closing off external access (“cyber-sovereignty”). In addition to its offensive capability, 
China has a defensive advantage through its “Great Firewall—the digital equivalent of their 
[physical] Great Wall—designed to require external communications to pass through 
several official filters.38 China’s research and development has grown 20 percent a year 
since 1999 and is estimated at US$233B; in addition, its quantum computing advances 
could enable China intelligence to create and break U.S. encryption channels.39 China’s 
increasing political control over its technology sector, which supplies digital infrastructure 
worldwide, opens up the opportunity for Chinese cyber-espionage. Eight companies are in 
China’s domestic supply chain in what the country coins, the “8 King Kongs”: Apple, 
Cisco, Google, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Oracle, and Qualcomm.40 China’s reliance on these 
companies for its internet technology infrastructure project a mission that is defensive, 
rather than offensive. However, in December 2015 the Chinese established the PLA 
Strategic Support Force “probably to improve oversight and command of Beijing’s 
growing military interests in space and cyberspace.”41 The creation of this cyberspace and 
electronic warfare branch for military support and reform gives the perception, at the very 
least, that China is taking a preemptive, offensive stance rather than reducing aggression. 
In a recent CBS News interview, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo recently stated 
that “the theft of American intellectual property is a big business [for China] to the tune of 
hundreds of billions of dollars and President Trump is determined to push back against 
 
37 Adam Segal, “When China Rules the Web: Technology in Service of the State,” Foreign Affairs, 
September 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-08-13/when-china-rules-web. 
38 Geremie R. Barme and Sang Ye, “The Great Firewall of China,” Wired, June 1 1997, 
https://www.wired.com/1997/06/china-3. 
39 Segal, “When China Rules the Web.” 
40 Jinghua Lyu, “What Are China’s Cyber Capabilities and Intentions?” IPI Global Observatory, April 
1, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/01/what-are-china-s-cyber-capabilities-and-intentions-
pub-78734. 
41 Patrick Howell O’Neill, “DNI: Chinese Hacking Against U.S. Companies Is ‘Ongoing’ But 
‘Significantly Reduced,’” Cyberscoop, May 23, 2017, https://www.cyberscoop.com/china-us-hacking-
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it.”42 FBI Director Christopher Wray also stated that “No country poses a broader threat 
… than China” whose long-term cyber strategies are calculated and persistent.43 While 
much attention the last couple years has been focused on Russia’s cyber activities and 
meddling, North Korea and China have been increasing their activities with an “uptick of 
blended threats in which foreign governments join forces with cyber criminals.44 The depth 
and breadth of China’s activities, combined with our system vulnerabilities, pose a greater 
cyber threat to homeland security than solely the Russia problem.  
2. Russia  
Russia is a dominating power within the cyber domain. The Kremlin uses cyber 
espionage and malicious cyberattacks to project power, influence communications, 
interfere in nation-state government affairs, and establish traction in organizations. Russian 
cyber activities trend toward “weaponization” of information—manipulating social and 
news media to influence public opinion and undermine credible sources.45 A prime 
example of Russian information weaponization was their misinformation campaign 
targeting American voters during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The Kremlin utilized 
Facebook trolls to post inflammatory messages and elicit emotional responses that steered 
election candidate discussions in certain directions.46 In addition, the Russians ran 
unregulated, divisive political ads on Facebook to further influence the elections.47 
 
42 Erin Banco, “FBI Director Christopher Wray Says Russia Remains a Threat to the 2020 Election,” 
Daily Beast, April 26, 2019, https://www.thedailybeast.com/fbi-director-christopher-wray-says-russia-
remains-a-threat-to-2020-election. 
43 Banco.  
44 Teri Robinson, “FBI Director Wray Says Cyber-threats ‘Bigger Than Government,’” SC Magazine, 
March 7, 2019, https://www.scmagazineuk.com/fbi-director-wray-says-cyber-threats-bigger-government/
article/.1578178. 
45 Ed Parsons and Michael Raff, “Understanding the Cyber Threat from Russia,” F-Secure, accessed 
March 22, 2020, https://www.f-secure.com/en/consulting/our-thinking/understanding-the-cyber-threat-
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Russia’s meddling and misinformation campaign helped swing the U.S. presidential 
election away from Hillary Clinton in favor of Donald Trump.  
Russian-backed cyberattacks have increased in frequency and destructiveness. In 
October 2017, President Trump signed a law that banned Moscow-based anti-virus firm 
Kaspersky Lab within the U.S. government. The concern was that the firm had ties to the 
Russian government, posing a grave risk to national security via cyber espionage.48 
Russia’s cyber policy has transitioned from information-gathering to offensive disruptions. 
During the 2018 Olympics Games in Pyeongchang, South Korea, the International 
Olympic Committee suspended and prohibited 168 Russian athletes from competing under 
the Russian flag based on doping evidence.49 In retaliation, the Russian government 
attacked the games’ opening ceremony, shutting down Seoul data servers, the backbone of 
the Olympics’ IT infrastructure.50 The Russian hackers used their trademark deception 
technique: creating layers of false flags to direct attribution elsewhere, in this case, toward 
North Korea.51 Only after in-depth, painstaking forensic analysis and examination of 
hidden connections and cyber fingerprints was the attack attributed to the Kremlin. 
The 2018 Pyeongchang Olympics and the 2016 U.S. election misinformation 
campaign demonstrate Russia’s advancement in deception techniques and sophisticated 
malicious cyber campaigns. 
3. North Korea 
In its 2019 global cyber threat report, CrowdStrike, a cybersecurity firm, described 
North Korea as a growing threat with its Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)-
 
48 Dustin Volz, “Trump Signs Into Law U.S. Government Ban on Kaspersky Lab Software,” 
December 12, 2017, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-kaspersky/trump-signs-into-
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49 Elias Chakhak, “Winter Olympics Cyber Attack Signs Point to Russia—So Why the False-Flag?” 
Cyber Research Databank, accessed March 22, 2020, https://www.cyberdb.co/winter-olympics-cyber-
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based malicious activity—Hidden Cobra—supporting two primary areas of interest: 
financial targeting (currency generation efforts for Kim Jong-Un) and acquiring diplomatic 
information related to the U.S. and South Korea policy decisions.52 CrowdStrike has 
dubbed four hacking subgroups of North Korea’s notorious Lazarus group—Stardust 
Chollima, Silent Chollima, Labyrinth Chollima, and Ricochet Chollima—that appear to be 
launching attacks on behalf of the government, from cryptocurrency spear-phishing 
campaigns to supporting cyberespionage efforts.53 While the U.S. Congress was focused 
on fake Russian Facebook profiles during the 2016 election, nothing was publicized about 
North Korea’s fake profile campaigns (e.g., the Lazarus Group created its own fake copy 
of a Korean bible reading Android [malware] app to target South Koreans, which was 
widely available on Google Play).54 
North Korea is especially dangerous because of Kim Jong Un’s unpredictability. 
Forecasters believe that rising tensions between the United States and North Korea will, 
based on previous attacks, set in motion increased cyberattacks. Geopolitical tension 
surrounding the North Korean nuclear program are likely to precipitate North Korean–
state-sponsored malicious cyber activity against South Korea, Japan, and the United States. 
In its February 2019 report, “The Evolution of North Korean Cyber Threats,” the Asan 
Institute for Policy Studies came to similar conclusions based on North Korea’s 7,000-
hacker-strong cyber “army” and that low-cost, low-risk cyber operations allow the country 
to attack with little fear of retaliation.55  
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B. U.S. CYBER POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
Cyberspace is a focal point for U.S. and international interests, linking military, 
social, political, and economic power applications for modern life. Key policy 
developments have shaped U.S. cyber activities over the years. In-depth research and 
analysis could provide insight to the complexities of each policy and the national position 
as it evolves. An overview of cyber policy history provides a holistic framework for 
understanding of the current state of U.S. cyber policy.  
Interdependence of battlespace domains and their reliance on cyber technology 
stresses the need for offense-based cyber policy implementation.56 Employment of a “more 
agile and expansive approach” will incorporate cyber operations as a tool in counterterrorism 
efforts to stay ahead of our adversaries who pose a threat to the homeland.57 Several existing 
authorities will facilitate forward movement toward offense-based policy implementation. 
The National Security Act of 1947, created following World War II, restructured U.S. 
military and intelligence agencies and established the DOD, Secretary of Defense, National 
Security Council, CIA, NSA, and other agencies.58 The act established an official process 
for national security decisions and intelligence oversight.59 Titles 10 and 50 of the U.S. Code 
are mutually supporting authorities for leading U.S. offense-based cyber operations. Title 50 
governs U.S. military and intelligence operations, to include cyberspace, in defense of the 
United States.60 Executive Order 12333 has regulated the IC since 1981, but also directs the 
Secretary of Defense to “collect (including through clandestine means), analyze, produce, 
and disseminate information and intelligence [as well as] … defense and defense-related 
 
56 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Cross-Domain Synergy in Joint Operations: Planner’s Guide, 51. 
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57 White House, The, National Strategy for Counterterrorism (Washington, DC: White House, 2018), 
2, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/NSCT.pdf .  
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intelligence and counterintelligence.”61 Thus, military intelligence authorities provide a 
baseline for offense cyber-related operations and support. 
Title 10 also created combatant commands with statutory authorities whose 
commanders report directly to the Secretary of Defense. USCYBERCOM was officially 
created on November 12, 2008, under then-Defense Secretary Gates as a sub-unified 
command under U.S. Strategic Command, attaining initial operating capability on May 21, 
2010. At the time, USCYBERCOM was codified under a “dual-hat” authority with the 
NSA.62 The USCYBERCOM mission is to “direct, synchronize, and coordinate 
cyberspace planning and operations to defend and advance national interests in 
collaboration with domestic and international partners.”63 USCYBERCOM is located in 
Fort Meade, Maryland, and executes its cyber mission through four sub-unified military 
service cyber units: 
• 2nd Army—U.S. Army Cyber Command 
• 24th Air Force—Air Force Cyber 
• U.S. Tenth Fleet—Fleet Cyber Command 
• U.S. Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command64 
Each of these units directs “cyberspace operations, strengthens DOD cyberspace 
capabilities, and integrates and bolsters DOD’s cyber expertise.”65 USCYBERCOM’s 
structure is intended to design and train the cyber force, coordinate with international and 
interagency partners, and assure seamless mission execution. It is too soon in the U.S. 
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cyberspace effort to conclude if the process is working or if it presents a fragmented 
approach that calls for restructuring of the command.  
The 2008 National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-54) and Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-23) launched the Comprehensive National 
Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI). The initiative was released by George W. Bush and 
outlines U.S. cybersecurity policy, organizational, and security goals across the federal 
government. The CNCI was an effort to coordinate cyber policy across public and private 
sectors. Upon its public release on June 5, 2014, the unclassified version provided the 
public with new insight into U.S. cybersecurity, offense-based programs, tools, and policy 
efforts.66 These efforts assured the public that the United States was fully stepping into 
cyberspace to develop its power in the newest battlespace domain. 
One of the Obama administration’s objectives was to develop the CNCI into key 
elements of the broader national cybersecurity strategy and Obama’s Cyberspace Policy 
Review.67 In 2011, President Obama implemented the International Strategy for 
Cyberspace, which stated the U.S. goal to internationally “promote an open, interoperable, 
secure, and reliable information and communications infrastructure that supports 
international trade and commerce, strengthens international security, and fosters free 
expression and innovation” through development of rules of conduct within the laws 
governing cyberspace.68 This strategy was intended to be a roadmap for better coordination 
of roles, definitions, and implementation of cyber policy. Ambiguity still exists regarding 
rules of conduct and governing cyberspace laws, which is discussed in the following text. 
The United States should be committed to leading dialogue, sharing best practices, and 
building relationships on critical cyber issues. President Obama signed Presidential Policy 
Directive (PPD-20) U.S. Cyber Operations Policy in 2012, which superseded the Bush 
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Administration’s NSPD-38, National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, and complemented 
NSPD-54 and HSPD-23 by integrating cyber tools with national security. The directive 
required an oversight review process from the U.S. Department of State and IC agencies 
before the military could launch an offense-based cyberattack, which could be viewed as 
cumbersome and time consuming. Critics have argued that the PPD-20 involves too many 
agencies that hinder and slow down potential cyber planning.69 Others deemed the review 
process necessary to ensure civilian control over the military, prevent unnecessary 
escalation, promote fair decision-making, and avoid overlap with existing operations.70  
In 2011, private U.S. cybersecurity firms began highlighting the damage caused by 
rampant Chinese hackers.71 The United States is a continual espionage target of China, 
which uses hackers and spies to obtain U.S. trade, patent, and military information, 
allowing Chinese companies access to U.S. technology Research and Development “details 
of countless pieces of American military hardware, from fighter jets to ground vehicles.”72 
In 2013, President Barack Obama raised the issue of cyber-hacking, debating deterrent and 
punitive options but was met with pushback from inside his administration.73 In 2014, the 
United States finally achieved some leverage over China when it indicted five PLA 
members for cyberespionage—the first time the United States indicted state-sponsored 
actors for a cybercrime.74 The PLA ran China’s main cyber campaign for almost 10 years 
between 2005 and 2014; however, once PLA members were detained by the United States, 
the Chinese Ministry of State Security became the preeminent driver of a powerful cyber 
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espionage campaign against the United States.75 The continuing Chinese threat cemented 
a requirement for domestic and international cyber regulatory mechanisms for cyber 
disputes. 
The PLA confrontation was a broader effort to define cyberspace norms. In 2015, 
President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping entered the United States and China into 
a bilateral Cyber Agreement to reduce aggression and instability in cyberspace, including 
known cyber-related intellectual property theft and joint cybercrime dialogue, and 
promoting “appropriate norms of state behavior in cyberspace within the international 
community.”76 The cyber discussions that led to the agreement arose out of a history of 
persistent Chinese government cyberattacks against the U.S. government. Of particular 
note, President Barack Obama vowed to countervail to attain China’s attention in response 
to PLA indictment.77 After the first few months of the agreement, there was a significant 
reduction in cyber espionage attacks attributed to the Chinese.78 However, China continues 
to develop its cyber strategy in response to the evolving cyber domain as well as to align 
with its military and national security strategies.  
In April 2015, the DOD released Cyber Strategy, which contained five strategic 
goals that included relationship building, defensive security, and managing conflict 
escalation. to the strategy strengthens U.S. cyber deterrence and aligns with DOD’s three 
cyber missions to “defend DOD networks, systems, and information; defend the U.S. 
homeland and U.S. national interests against cyberattacks of significant consequence; and 
support operational and contingency plans.”79 See Figure 2 for a recent depiction of the 
DOD Cyber Strategy aligned with its other strategies, including national security. 
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Figure 2. DOD Cyber Strategy Alignment with DOD Guidance80 
The first strategic goal, to “build and maintain ready forces and capabilities to conduct 
cyberspace operations” to be properly equipped for effective operation in cyberspace, is the 
foundation for implementing U.S. cyber policy and developing a powerful cyberspace 
presence.81  
An assertive offense-based cyber strategy may not be the most favorable method for 
U.S. leadership, diplomats, and top private-sector executives who may be more concerned 
about sensitive bilateral strategic relationships than data and intellectual property stolen or 
affected by cyberhackers. Diplomacy is the heart of international partner relationships, 
providing foreign country representatives with an understanding of U.S. perspectives on 
foreign policy issues and facilitates important, often complex, bilateral and multilateral 
agreement negotiations for treaties, accords, conventions, and alliances.82 Jeopardizing 
diplomatic ties could cause political entities to shy away from offense-based support.83  
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The State Department is the U.S. leader in diplomatic engagement to achieve foreign 
policy objectives.84 The department submitted to Congress its International Cyberspace 
Strategy in April 2016, reflecting three themes to support the President’s International 
Strategy for Cyberspace (released in 2011): the applicability of international law; the 
importance of promoting confidence building measures; and the significant progress the 
department has made, working in partnership with other federal departments and agencies, to 
promote international norms of state behavior in cyberspace, as well as future plans in this 
area.85 The document focused mostly on U.S.–China cyber commitments, “diplomatic efforts 
to shape the policy environment, building a framework for international stability in 
cyberspace,” and tools available to deter malicious actors.86 The State Department strategy 
champions a multi-stakeholder approach to internet governance utilizing whole-of-
government tools to achieve its objectives.87 However, the document fails to state how, 
exactly, the tools will be used or what roles the stakeholders would play. 
The 2017 National Security Strategy introduced a whole-of-government strategy 
through four cyber-themed pillars representing vital national interests. The pillars draw 
attention to domestic strength, military security, and dependence on strategic partnerships:  
1. Protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life 
2. Promote American prosperity 
3. Preserve peace through strength 
4. Advance American influence88 
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The National Security Strategy recognizes global interconnectedness calling for 
innovative ways to renew the United States’ competitive advantage to put “America first” 
by protecting its people and strengthening the nation’s future position in the world. The 
National Security Strategy addresses revisionist powers (i.e., China and Russia) as key 
challenges to U.S. interests and values. The strategy indicates the cyber realm is shifting 
back to a great power struggle between nations seeking to establish their dominance over 
neighboring countries. The strategy outlines the innovative use of cyber to secure our 
borders against criminal and terrorist threats, safeguard critical infrastructure and digital 
networks, advance diplomacy, and achieve better technology to strengthen U.S. cyber 
capabilities to obtain an advantage in the global cyber stage.  
In 2018, the National Security Presidential Memorandum–13 replaced PPD-20, 
providing new cyber authorities that are less restrictive and allowing the president of the 
United States to delegate (under certain circumstances) offense-based authorities across 
the cyber spectrum to the U.S. Secretary of Defense. Previously, offense-based operations 
were not authorized outside of armed conflict, requiring presidential authority, National 
Security Council review, and interagency coordination—a process that was not 
expeditious.89 Although the process and plans for operations are still publicly ambiguous, 
unclear, and in progress, the new directive will facilitate the information network 
protection through offense-based measures and coordination with public, private, and 
international partners. The DOD will be delegated offense-based authorities within a 
particular mission area; however, dialogue to maintain a consensus on the “how” that will 
be achieved remains to be solidified.90  
On April 17, 2018, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Kirstjen 
Nielsen announced that the United States would be taking steps toward a more aggressive 
and offense-based cyber policy, with the objective of replacing previous complacency with 
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appropriate consequences to “call out malicious cyber behavior and to punish it.”91 A day 
earlier, the United States and United Kingdom (UK) issued a joint statement, the first of its 
kind, providing warning and advice to mitigate future cyber operations and malicious 
attacks from state-sponsored (Kremlin-backed) Russian hackers. “Russia is our most 
capable hostile adversary in cyberspace so dealing with their attacks is a major priority for 
the National Cyber Security Centre and our U.S. allies,” said Ciaran Martin, CEO of the 
UK’s National Cyber Security Centre, the cyber arm of the Government Communications 
Headquarters.92 The 2018 National Cyber Strategy of the United States of America not 
only supports a strong cyber security defense but also a shift toward deterrence, resiliency, 
punitive actions, collective interoperability, and collaboration with private, public, and 
international partners.93  
Not everyone supports a U.S. offense-based cyber policy, including Brad Smith, 
president of Microsoft. A day after the U.S.–UK joint cyber warning, a “digital Geneva 
accord” was created, initially with 34 entities signing on, to declare they would not help or 
support any government in offense-based cyberwarfare.94 The Cybersecurity Tech Accord 
now has over 60 companies on board, including Facebook, LinkedIn, and Amazon, to 
“protect and empower civilians online and to improve the security, stability and resilience 
of cyberspace.”95 In addition, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), an independent 
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think tank organization, deduces that cyberattacks lack the lethality of other conventional 
weapons—such as air strikes, bombs, tanks, and fighter jets—and will not be able to garner 
the political support to prioritize funding for offense-based capabilities.96 CFR’s 
assumption, however, is flawed: cyberspace networks are vast, transcending geographical 
boundaries; state actors can quickly launch cyberattacks on other countries with 
devastating non-lethal and lethal effects. For example, NotPetya was a Russian state-
sponsored ransomware cyberattack against Ukraine to show political force.97 The malware 
spread “automatically, rapidly, and indiscriminately,” causing over 300 Ukrainian 
companies worldwide $10 billion in damages, in what one person described as, “a bombing 
of all our systems.”98 Across the Atlantic, Maersk, a maritime company responsible for a 
fifth of the world’s shipping containers, was left stranded in New Jersey as a result of the 
destroyed data, affecting worldwide trade and commerce.99 A year later, victim companies 
were putting millions of dollars toward technology cleanup, disrupted business, and lost 
sales.100  
The Russian state-sponsored ransomware was meant to be destructive and it created 
one of the most devastating cyberattacks in internet history. NotPetya is a case study for 
offense-based cyber operations. The destruction path left by the ransomware could have 
been worse—possible lethal— affecting not only equipment that maintains livelihood, but 
also critical infrastructure, whereby consequences of an electrical grid power outage could 
have rendered hospital life-support systems inoperable. Cyberattacks like NotPetya cause 
global collateral damage that is invasive, disruptive, paralyzing, and nondiscriminatory. 
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Another NotPetya could happen again on a larger scale and there may not be an appropriate 
defense for a similar reckless attack, which is why it may be vital to have an appropriate 
offense.  
Distinguishing between a hostile, conventional enemy and a civilian on their 
computer is illogical: both can cause catastrophic damage. The methods may not be as 
dramatic or violent, but the results can be similar. Hypothetical example: if a Washington, 
DC, power grid was cyberattacked, one or more hospitals in the metropolitan area would 
be without electricity to run machines needed to sustain patients’ lives. Contingency 
operations such as backup generators would be implemented, but that does not guarantee 
the protection of all patients who are dependent on electrical power for their support and 
survival; one or more citizens may die. In addition, that same targeted cyber strike on 
critical infrastructure may quickly escalate to retaliatory actions, both cyber as well as 
kinetic (conventional weapons). Cyberattacks can, indeed, have lethal consequences.  
Also in 2018, the National Cyber Strategy released a whole-of-government 
approach to combat the threat of cyber actors targeting U.S. government interests and the 
private sector. One key component was the role of DHS in assuming the lead for federal 
(non-DOD and non-IC) cybersecurity and information technologies. In assuming this role, 
DHS will have unfettered access to all federal government systems outside of the IC and 
DOD and be one of the lead agencies for securing federal government systems in the cyber 
domain.101  
On October 3, 2018, the Senate passed the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Security Agency (CISA) Act of 2017102 and on November 16, 2018, the CISA Act became 
public law (No. 115–278). Under this bill, DHS National Protection and Programs 
Directorate (NPPD) transitioned into the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 
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Agency.103 The NPPD was established in 2007 and handled most of DHS cyber-related 
projects. In 2017, NPPD received 106,000 federal and critical infrastructure cyber-incident 
reports, responded to 23 on-site incidents, and identified over 129,000 cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities.104 The CISA was transformed into a standalone agency in charge of 
overseeing civilian and federal cybersecurity programs. Figure 3 depicts CISA’s position 
as a standalone agency within the DHS organizational structure. 
 
Figure 3. DHS Organizational Chart Depicting CISA (in red box)105 
In an effort to deliver services to state, local, and tribal partners as well as critical 
infrastructure owners and operators, CISA has 10 regional offices strategically placed in 
close proximity, where possible, to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
offices, as shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. CISA Regional Service Delivery Sections106 
In addition to support modeled after FEMA’s regional structure, CISA Director 
Christopher Krebs is using the next two years—2019 to 2021—to mature the agency. 
CISA’s priorities over that timeframe include election security, government network 
security, potential threats from foreign virtual private networks, and keeping Chinese tech 
suppliers, like Huawei, out of networks using 5G mobile telecommunications.107 The 
priorities mark an objective to harden defensives against primary adversaries, Russia and 
China, and mitigate risk. 
The international community’s consensus to develop better cyber strategies 
indicates the need for the United States to step up its cyber capabilities to achieve national 
security objectives, collaborate with key partners, and attribute and deter cyber activities 
to identify hostile foreign state-sponsored cyber programs, intentions, and capabilities.108 
A challenge across U.S. public and private sectors is implementing current cyber policies 
to accomplish the president’s objectives and achieve dominant cyber presence while 
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operating within undefined rules of conduct, engagement, and confusing law of 
cyberwarfare. 
The cyber domain present at the creation of USCYBERCOM in 2008 has 
significantly changed, requiring a new—or at the very least modified—approach to 
influence malign cyber behavior and improve U.S. national security. Until 2018, the United 
States operated under a more defensive policy, countering attacks as or after they entered 
the American sphere, as well as focusing on protection and cybersecurity.109 The DOD’s 
cyber model used to maintain distinct, separate cyberspace and information operations 
(IO), but as technology and the use of the information space evolved, the DOD found it 
hard to maintain pace with foreign adversarial attacks that integrated their cyber activities 
and IO operations.110 
During the USCYBERCOM’s inaugural Cyberspace Strategy Symposium at 
National Defense University on February 15, 2018, discussions centered around the 
expanded Command Vision to integrate integrating cyber and IO capabilities to influence 
adversarial advantages over the United States within the confines of the law. The DOD 
Cyber Strategy followed in September 2018, encompassing the “defending forward” 
concept to disrupt malicious cyber activity at its source through persistent offense-based 
engagements with adversaries that fall below the level of warfare.111 The recent policy 
shift enables the DOD to regularly take action in cyberspace against state actors that pose 
strategic threats, such as Russia and China. Day-to-day cyberspace operations will be used 
for intelligence collection, military cyber planning, and disruption of malicious activity at 
its source. The strategic aim is to strengthen cyber-defense security and resiliency while 
actively competing against cyber competitors in an offense-based capacity to build a U.S. 
cyber advantage with partner agencies, industry, and international partners.  
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An objective in declaring an aggressive cyber domain, as is an objective across all 
U.S. military domains, is to “achieve and maintain superiority” against our adversaries, as 
well as provide notice that the United States has the capabilities to “defend and advance 
national interests in collaboration with domestic and foreign partners.”112 The 
USCYBERCOM approach, as discussed in its 2018 Command Vision, is to deviate from 
the cyber terms “hacking” and “attacking,” labels that bin cyberattacks as mere nuisances, 
towards “deterrence,” acknowledging sophisticated cyber campaigns that seek to degrade 
U.S. power.113 Cyber operations have opened a new dimension in the battlespace and can 
impact U.S. cyberspace dominance, presence, and power without traditional armed 
aggression. It is imperative that the United States lead and engage with the international 
community to develop and implement an effective governance structure to guide and 
advance national interests in the cyber domain. On May 4, 2018, President Donald Trump, 
under the advisement of Defense Secretary James Mattis, officially elevated the sub-
command to a Unified Combatant Command in response to the growing cyberspace threat 
and operating environment. It is yet to be seen if USCYBERCOM’s elevation will enable 
it to be aggressive and forwardly defensive in the cyber fight.  
The DOD built upon their cyber strategy with its 2019 Digital Modernization 
Strategy as a roadmap to support the cyber strategy’s lines of effort consisting of the cloud, 
artificial intelligence, command, control and communications, and cybersecurity. The 
strategy’s objective to “increase capabilities across [the DOD] and strengthen overall 
adoption of enterprise systems to expand the competitive space in the digital arena” will 
be achieved through four main initiatives: innovation for competitive advantage, 
optimization, resilient cybersecurity, and cultivation of talent.114 The digital 
modernization effort priorities and goals are depicted in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. DOD Digital Modernization Goals (left) and Priorities (right) 2019115 
It is too soon to tell if the digital modernization strategic roadmap will be successful 
in implementing the cyber strategy objectives. If it is successful, the DOD may see an 
increase in the military’s cyber-technological capabilities to ensure military personnel have 
the tools necessary to maintain a ready workforce. 
C. THE MAIN CYBER ACTORS 
There are three main subsets of actors with significant cyber capabilities that can 
be impacted by U.S. cyber strategy: nation-states, non-state actors, and proxies. As 
previously mentioned, nation-state actors—Russia, North Korea, are China—are at the 
forefront of cyber discussions among cyber-centric international governments, the private 
sector, and academia. Nation-state threats are recognized as high-end priorities critical to 
merit foci of national resource and response. A gap, however, pertains to information about 
non-state actors and proxy state actors regarding compliance and enforcement mechanisms. 
Both types of actors pose interesting cyber challenges because of the difficulties of 
attribution and accountability. For example, proxy-state actors provide a distinct 
governance challenge because they may be purportedly acting under the arm of a state 
 
115 Source: Department of Defense, DoD Digital Modernization Strategy 2019.  
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actor, but the state actor refuses acknowledgement of and claim to their actions. Non-state 
actors do not normally bear obligations under international law, a framework by which 
states are held responsible for actions, which makes it difficult to bind non-state actors for 
the wrongful acts they commit.116 
1. Nation-State Actors 
The majority of cyber governance research and discussions cover nation-state 
actors. International laws, as well as the restatement of international laws into black letter 
rules in relation to the cyber domain as translated by the Tallinn Manual 2.0, pertain mostly 
to state actors. However, nation-state governance is interconnected with non-state and 
proxy state actors. Therefore, it is unwise to discuss non-state actors without briefly 
addressing nation-state and proxy actors. States, non-states, and proxies cannot be 
discussed in a vacuum. As such, this paper touches upon the nation-state issues due to the 
relevance to governance and interconnectedness of cyber activity but will not fully explore 
them to remain within scope of this paper.  
Russia and China are two of the most significant adversarial nation-state actors in 
the cyber domain, followed by North Korea. Their priorities are to obtain governmental 
information to provide advantages over the United States and its allies in negotiations and 
decision-making. State cyberattacks include cyberespionage, cyberwarfare, election 
interference, misinformation campaigns, phishing, denial of service, malware, stolen 
information, and other types of disruptions to governments, private sectors, and civilians. 
In July 2019, Microsoft noted that 8,000 of its customers had been attacked by nation-states 
over the past year.117  
One of the most significant state cyberattacks was the Stuxnet worm on an Iranian 
nuclear enrichment center, targeting supervisory control and data acquisition as well as 
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uranium centrifuges. In 2012, the New York Times posted an article stating the worm was 
part of a U.S.–Israeli cyberwar program called “Operation Olympic Games” that repeated 
attacks for several years. The attack resulted in “the spread of a template for what computer 
security experts have called the most dangerous cyberweapon ever.”118 Stuxnet is a 
significant attack because it changed the cyber landscape as it pertains to state actors with 
the first weaponized, targeted attack on a system thought to be isolated from cyberattacks. 
2. Proxy State Actors 
States use a variety of proxy relationships to project coercive power in cyberspace. 
Maurer defines cyber proxies as “intermediaries that conduct or directly contribute to an 
offensive cyber action that is enabled knowingly, whether actively or passively, by a 
beneficiary.”119 Proxy relationships typically fall under three categories: delegation, 
orchestration, and sanctioning (approving or permitting) with varying uses of coercive 
power. Table 1 displays the three proxy categories and the level of power a nation-state 
maintains in the proxy relationship.  
Table 1. State Proxy Relationships and Level of Coercive Power120 
Proxy Category Nation-State Power Relationship 
Delegation Tight leash; under state’s effective control 
Orchestration Looser leash; strong ideational bonds; receives funding or tools 
Sanctioning Passive support: state aware of activity of a non-state actor but turns 
a blind eye 
 
The 2014 Sony intrusion and the 2017 WannaCry ransomware cyberattack are 
recent examples of proxy state cyber activity. North Korea has significantly improved its 
offensive cyber capabilities over the past several years by taking advantage of proxy state 
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actors. The 2014 Sony studio-wide cyberattack leaked unreleased films online; posted 
executives’ salaries and passwords; and threatened employees with intimidating messages 
(Figure 6).121  
 
Figure 6. Example of the Intimidating Message in the 2014 Sony Attack122 
The attack catapulted North Korea’s evolution as a major threat in cyberspace; 
however, the 2017 WannaCry ransomware attack—made possible by the United States’ 
own NSA’s vulnerabilities—changed the cybersecurity game. The latter attack ramped up 
an evolution toward more sophisticated variations of global-scaled, multi-vectored, state-
sponsored cyberattacks. Over 300,00 computers in 150 countries were infected, causing 
billions of dollars in damages and halting worldwide business operations.123 The NSA 
issued an internal assessment stating Lazarus actors were sponsored by the Reconnaissance 
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General Bureau, North Korea’s intelligence bureau for clandestine operations.124 
Researchers noted that the 2017 attack “marked the shift toward using military-grade 
weapons, hacking tools that are powerful enough for a national cyber-defense agency to 
use on international cyber-warfare.”125 
Russia also extensively utilizes cyber mercenaries for proxy state actions. Turla is 
a Russian-sponsored cyberespionage group that conducts campaigns against government 
institutions using internally created as well as open-source exploitation tactics in their 
operations.126 In October 2019, the group was responsible for compromising an Iranian-
backed hacking group, OilRig or APT34, by exploiting their techniques and tools and using 
them to attack more than 35 countries.127 Initially, the attacks were attributed to the Iranian 
groups; however, it was later determined that Turla masked its identity through the Iranians 
by hijacking their IP addresses and accessing their command and control infrastructure. 
This case demonstrated that compromise indicators—forensic data—and identifying 
locations of infrastructure access can be useful in determining correct attribution. 
3. Non-state Actors 
Non-state actors are not at the forefront of cyber regulatory discussions even though 
they often conduct a preponderance of the malign cyber activities. Agent Ari Baranoff of 
the U.S. Secret Service stated “many of the [non-state] actors that we look at on a daily and 
weekly basis have capabilities that actually exceed the capabilities of most nation-
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states.”128 The National Intelligence Council defines non-state actors as “non-sovereign 
entities that exercise significant economic, political, or social power and influence at a 
national, and in some cases international, level.”129 The Journal of Military Studies 
provides a descriptive chart of the main non-state actors within the cyber domain. Their 
chart in Figure 7 lists the different types of non-state actors, their motivations for attacks 
(e.g., political change or financial gain), preferred targets, and methods used in conducting 
attacks. 
 
Figure 7. Main Non-state Actors in Cyberspace.130 
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Terrorists, terrorist supporters and sympathizers are also considered non-state 
actors. The FBI defines international terrorism as “violent, criminal acts committed by 
individuals and/or groups who are inspired by, or associated with, designated foreign 
terrorist organizations or nations” and domestic terrorism as similar acts to “further 
ideological goals stemming from domestic influences, such as those of a political, religious, 
social, racial, or environmental nature.”131 For the purposes of this thesis, non-state actor 
categorization will align with the National Intelligence Council, Journal of Military 
Science, and FBI to include hackers, hacktivists, terrorists, and cybercriminals, and their 
related organizations, who act according to their own agenda and ideologies without any 
ties to or support from nation-states. 
The United States serves as an integral component of non-state cyber governance. 
The FBI’s Cyber Division is the lead U.S. federal agency for investigating cyberattacks 
and intrusions onto government and private networks by non-state actors such as criminal 
organizations, terrorists, and other cyber adversaries. In January 2015, alleged Pro-Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) hackers compromised USCENTCOM’s Twitter and 
YouTube accounts. The terrorist sympathizers dubbed the “CyberCaliphate” accessed 
CENTCOM’s unclassified, commercial non-DOD servers for approximately 30 minutes, 
posting a picture of an ISIS fighter with the words, “i love you isis” and “AMERICAN 
SOLDIERS, WE ARE COMING, WATCH YOUR BACK” (Figure 8).132  
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Figure 8. Compromised U.S. CENTCOM Twitter Page133 
The Pentagon confirmed the attack, calling it a “prank” and labeled it cyber 
vandalism.134 Although USCENTCOM stated no classified information was posted, phone 
numbers and email addresses of personnel were listed during the 30-minute duration before 
taken down. Doubts have been raised pertaining to attribution; regardless of whether the 
attack was conducted by the CyberCaliphate or another non-state actor(s), it demonstrates 
the feasibility and low-cost measures that can make a mark on cyber infrastructure. 
Another example of the United States’ involvement in non-state cyber regulatory 
measures was the 2016 Avalanche case. The U.S. Department of Justice announced in 
December 2016 that its Cyber Division, along with the FBI Criminal Division, Western 
District of Pennsylvania U.S. Attorney’s Office, Germany’s Public Prosecutor’s Office and 
local police, Europol, investigators and prosecutors from more than 40 global jurisdictions, 
and numerous other entities partnered to dismantle a criminal infrastructure—Avalanche—
through a multinational operation that resulted in arrests in four countries.135 Avalanche 
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was a cybercriminal network, accessed through criminal underground online forums, that 
provided a secure infrastructure for criminal campaigns and transactions, such as malware 
money laundering “money mule” schemes outside of the purview of law enforcement. 
Since 2010 when Avalanche became operational, the network redirected stolen financial 
information from up to 500,000 malware-infected computers daily, causing worldwide 
monetary losses estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars.136 This case is an 
example of the United States collaborating with international law enforcement partners to 
take down organized cybercrime. In this case, jurisdiction was determined based on the 
location of malware attack victims in the Western District of Pennsylvania. To bring the 
case forward for prosecution, the Department of Justice relied on a temporary restraining 
order for violations of Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1344, and 2511, without which the unlawful 
actions would continue, causing “irreparable harm to both individuals and businesses in 
the United States.”137 GozNym was one of the malwares used by the Avalanche criminals. 
On September 8, 2016, Krasimir Nikolov was arrested in Bulgaria and extradited to the 
United States for his connection with the GozNym malware. On October 4, 2016, Nikolov 
was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania as a 
conspirator of unauthorized access of a computer to obtain financial information, bank 
fraud, and criminal conspiracy.138 The Avalanche network supported more than 800,000 
domains that facilitated criminal money mule transactions between the malware victims 
and the cybercriminals. 
The Avalanche case demonstrates the need for a multi-lateral, multipronged 
regulatory mechanism for non-state cyber activities. The United States faces a multitude 
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of significant threats from multiple capable state, proxy state, and non-state actors that rank 
above a single nation-state. There needs to be greater cooperation and coordination among 
U.S. and international governments, private sectors, and academic partners to properly 
address these complex threats. 
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III. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
AND CYBERSPACE 
In order to determine an effective regulatory mechanism for cyberspace, it is 
necessary to understand cyber concepts as they currently exist. This chapter begins with an 
overview of the law of war (LOW), a concept integral to governance. Although the 
regulatory mechanisms explored and proposed in this thesis pertain to peacetime activities, 
it is essential to understand LOW at a high level as an integral part of the holistic cyber 
governance picture. Next, the chapter examines the principle sections of international law 
as restated in the Tallinn Manual 2.0, followed by the Budapest Convention, the first 
international treaty on cybercrime. Both are frameworks to consider and evaluate in 
Chapter IV when developing a cyber regulatory mechanism. The chapter concludes with a 
look at the functions of the UN and NATO, two organizations involved in global crisis 
management, peace, and security cooperation. The organizational subsections provide a 
foundation of knowledge leading in to Chapter IV’s determination of a single or multiple-
entity regulatory mechanism. 
The international community needs to develop common understandings about how 
the rules and law of armed conflict apply—or do not apply—and what should be done in 
this area. The cyber domain is not a lawless space free from rules and compliance.139 
Nations widely agree that established principles of international law do apply in 
cyberspace; the question remains how should they apply, what changes or additions need 
to be made based on the landscape, and how should they be governed?140 An international 
governing body or mechanism serves as the umbrella entity that fosters the collaborative 
partnerships and relationships prior to cyber crises and adverse cyber events. Once 
established, the trickle-down effect will provide significant guidance in developing U.S. 
policies and procedures for domestic regulation and international compliance within the 
cyber domain.  
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The first step in examining application of international law to cyber actors is to evaluate 
the existing application of international law to state actors in the traditional sense; then, the 
next step is to determine whether such laws similarly apply to non-state actors in the cyber 
domain.  
A. LAW OF WAR OVERVIEW 
For the purpose of this paper, an overview of ROE and LOW are provided along 
with their application to the cyber domain. ROE are necessary across each of the five 
battlespace domains to mitigate conflict and ensuing consequences of escalating 
attacks.141 In the rapidly changing cyber domain, state actors such as Russia and North 
Korea are pushing the boundaries of warfare, which leads to the questions: What are the 
boundaries of cyber warfare? Should cyber warfare ROE align with international and U.S. 
military ROE or should cyber ROE be unique to the digital cyber domain?  
Fear looms that a proactive, offense-based U.S. cyber environment may prompt 
retaliatory cyber operations, leading to increased costs due to cyclical, reactive cyber 
operations and increased vulnerabilities. The United States holds an advantage in 
conventional military domains that may sway and “may prompt U.S. adversaries to seek 
other (non-cyber) asymmetric—and potentially effective—means of contesting or 
responding to U.S. behavior in cyberspace.”142 Physical, conventional operations can be 
measured and observed by the augmentation of troops, weaponry, and aircraft over days 
and weeks. Kinetic operations require training and expertise to handle the weapons as well 
as funding to support the activity. Asymmetric cyber operations differ because the 
development of attack is hard to observe; the cyber weapon is hard to trace and detect, 
making attribution difficult; execution of attacks does not require a high degree of 
expertise; and funding is not necessary for successful execution. The ability to cause major 
damage with minor resources makes cyber operations favorable over traditional warfare. 
The accessibility and feasibility for non-state actors to carry out asymmetric cyber 
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operations places the United States and international community in a position to have their 
vulnerabilities exploited.  
Offense-based strategies carry the risk of conflict with foreign states in cyberspace 
and could lead to retaliatory adversarial responses, spiraling into a back-and-forth cyber 
battle due to the lack of clear rules of conduct, mechanisms, and methods for escalation 
control. Military doctrine expanded its battle domains beyond air, land, and sea to include 
space and cyberspace.143 As a result of unclear thresholds, a line of thought among the 
international community is that cyber conflicts could quickly escalate, becoming kinetic, 
“because of misperception or miscalculation.”144 Recent hacking attacks such as Sony and 
the U.S. presidential election highlight the complexities involved when official ROE do 
not exist; questions arise as to when the line defining cyberwarfare is crossed and when, as 
well as how, a consistent, effective, and expedient response should be issued.145 Although 
there have been extensive international, intergovernmental, and public discussions about 
ROE and LOW as it applies to cyber warfare, no publicly available, well-defined ROE or 
protocols for offense-based, aggressive responses to cyberattacks currently exist to guide 
nations’ behavior.  
According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication (JP) 1–04, LOW is defined as 
that part of war that “regulates the conduct of states and combatants engaged in armed 
hostilities” with the purpose to “prevent unnecessary suffering, safeguard certain 
fundamental human rights of those involved in a conflict, and to ultimately restore 
peace.”146 The LOW, also known as the law of armed conflict, encompasses all 
international law for conflict of which the United States is a part, including treaties and 
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agreements, and is binding on the United States and its citizens.147 As stated in JP 1-04, 
its purpose is to facilitate peace, provide humanitarian safeguards for all classes of 
civilians, combatants, and noncombatants as well as to prevent the escalation of conflict 
into cruel violence if peace cannot be immediately achieved. Under Title 10, USC Section 
156, the assigned legal counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible 
for reviewing and advising on LOW and ROE as they relate to cyberspace operations.148 
In 2017, Secretary of Defense James Mattis loosened the requirements for ROE to enable 
the U.S. military to move more quickly against terrorist organizations.149 Previously, 
troops had to be in contact with the enemy, or were bound by proximity, before they could 
strike; this requirement has been removed.150 Terrorists and state actors are hostile 
adversaries with lethal capabilities wishing to cause harm to the United States. If the United 
States follows military ROE for the cyber domain, this update could support current U.S. 
policies calling for more aggressive cyber operations.  
Figure 9 provides a chart to understand the comparison between traditional and 
cyber warfare domains. Based on this chart, an assumption can be made that cyber warfare 
will become favorable to U.S. adversaries due to inexpensive resources, challenging 
attribution, cross-sector environment, and collateral effects that are global in nature.  
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Figure 9. List of Characteristics Comparing Cyber Domain vs. 
Traditional Warfare Domains151 
When a devastating cyberattack occurs, for example, disabling large-scale power 
grids across the country, when and how do the ROE and LOW apply? Does the current 
policy allow for a kinetic troops-on-the-ground war? Do we respond in kind? Or, is it a 
case-by-case basis decided by our national policymakers? The answers to these questions 
may only be known in fragments or behind classified closed doors.  
The chart in Figure 10 depicts information (cyber) and kinetic (traditional) warfare 
along a spectrum, with all actions falling between purely kinetic or purely informational. 
Any actions above the red line (threshold for declaring war) are the most severe; for 
example, a cyberattack that destroys the national power grid (highest severity for 
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information warfare) or a nuclear strike (highest severity for kinetic warfare).152 More 
cyber than kinetic actions fall in the gray section denoting legal ambiguity with respect to 
international law. 
 
Figure 10. Information and Kinetic Warfare Spectrum Chart153 
At present, gaps still remain regarding cyberwarfare ROE and LOW. UN Secretary-
General Antonio Guterres has stated in two separate speeches to the delegation that “there 
is no regulatory scheme for [cyber] warfare” because “it is not clear how the Geneva 
Convention [s] or international humanitarian law applies.”154 Articles 2 and 3 of the 
Geneva Convention of 1949—international rules that apply during armed conflict— 
provide that war may be declared when there is partial or total occupation of territory, 
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armed conflict between two or more parties, or conflict between states whereby war is not 
recognized between them. The UN broadly interprets “war” as any nonconformity with the 
“principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international 
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.”155 By this definition, is 
knocking out a power grid a “nonconformity”? 
In USCYBERCOM’s Command Vision, two primary risks are discussed: 1) laser-
like focus on highly capable state actors will shift resources and attention from other cyber 
actors; 2) the United States is viewed as aggressive in the international community and an 
offense-based assertion may be perceived as militarization of the cyber environment. 
USCYBERCOM briefly explains mitigation of these risks through system resiliency, 
intelligence sharing, and augmented relationships with law enforcement, IC, the homeland 
security enterprise, and coalition partners and, increased outreach with the public to 
communicate adversarial threats, actions, and the U.S. emphasis on civil liberties.156 The 
declaration of cyberspace as an operational domain does not guarantee that those 
associations will immediately and fully garner support for such operations due to fear of 
inadvertent consequences such as escalation, unnecessarily militarizing cyberspace, and 
jeopardizing the relationships upon which the United States is dependent.157 Offense-
based operations will require persistent collaboration with government, military, and 
private-sector entities to shape perceptions in favor of USCYBERCOM’s objectives and 
develop widespread support.  
The Cybersecurity Tech Accord arose to protect against offense efforts and is a 
promise by members to forgo cyber warfare. Tampering or exploiting a Microsoft or 
Google vulnerability, for example, would be in violation of this agreement. The objective 
of the Cybersecurity Tech Accord is to provide a highlight of current and future threats to 
customers; prioritize security, privacy, and reduce vulnerabilities; enhance global response 
to threats; and protect “against exploitation of technology products and services during 
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their development, design, distribution and use.”158 Although the Cybersecurity Tech 
Accord arose out of a desire to set cyberspace norms of behavior and cyberwarfare rules 
of conduct, the accord is missing signers from key countries responsible for devastating 
state-sponsored cyberattacks, including Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran.159 The 
agreement is a challenge to U.S. efforts in garnering worldwide support across the private 
sector. 
The United States has national and global strategic interests in understanding and 
mitigating these offense-based cyber policy risks. The world depends on networked 
systems for homeland security missions, critical infrastructure, health care systems, 
commerce, and modern-day living. The longer it takes to implement cyber norms, 
including ROE, the greater the likelihood of unnecessary military escalation and diplomatic 
severance in and outside of the cyber domain.  
State, true non-state, and proxy actors can use cyberattacks in the context of 
military-styled operations above the threshold for cyber warfare. LOW consists of jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello.160 Similar to the consensus that international law in general should 
apply to the cyber domain, there is consensus that the tenets of jus in bello and jus ad 
bellum should apply to cyber warfare. Jus in bello and jus ad bellum generally operate 
independently of each other. Jus ad bellum is essential to determining whether to resort to 
war based on an aggressive measure, with determining principles including a “competent 
authority to order the war for a public purpose; a just cause (such as self-defense); the 
means must be proportionate to the just cause; all peaceful alternatives must have been 
exhausted; and a right intention on the part of the just belligerent.”161 Jus in bello as 
defined by the DOD in its 2016 War of Law Manual is “law [applied to both defenders and 
aggressors] relating to the conduct of hostilities and the protection of war victims … [and 
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is] applicable to the United States, including treaties to which the United States is a Party, 
and applicable customary international law.”162 An aggressor or defender can be in 
compliance with jus in bello but not be legally justified for military operations under jus 
ad bellum. According to Law of War Manual, “when no specific rule applies, the principles 
of LOW form the general guide for conduct during war.”163 The tenets of jus in bello and 
jus ad bellum, along with the Geneva Conventions (1949 and amended) and Rules of 
Engagement (ROE) are rooted in the Just War Tradition—agreed-upon morals, ethical 
codes, and customary norms for justifications and limitations warfighting.164  
A weapon is a weapon, whether it is a hacker using a computer or a bomb dropped 
from an airplane. Traditional LOW applies to cyberspace but the topic is unsettled and 
heavily debated to determine what counts as use of force within the meaning of jus ad 
bellum and in conducting a cyberwar (jus in bello). Offense and defensive principles can 
become blurred in cyber, especially with secrecy and attribution posing a noticeable 
challenge and risk not prevalent traditional conventional warfare.  
B. RESTATEMENT OF LAW: TALLINN MANUAL 2.0’S EXAMINATION 
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 provides comprehensive information on how international 
laws apply to the cyber domain during peace time. Although the manual is nonbinding and 
merely a restatement of the application and interpretation of international laws, it provides 
understanding and commentary for approaching the translation of the black letter rules—
accepted basic principles of law that are no longer subject to dispute—to states, and thereby 
non-state actors within the cyber domain. The manual provides a framework that explores 
applicable general principles of international law, the law of state responsibility, the law of 
the sea, international telecommunications law, space law, diplomatic and consular law, 
and, with respect to individuals, human rights law. 
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However, neither Tallinn Manual restates the laws according to states’ 
interpretation; they restate the law as it was interpreted by experts in their own views. The 
intent “was never to make law or to produce a manual that would have the force of law” 
but rather reflect the law at the time (lex lata).165 Regardless, Tallinn 2.0 is a valuable 
reference book and starting point for cyber regulatory conversations. The scope of Tallinn 
2.0 touches upon jus ad bellum and jus in bello as a follow-on to the original Tallinn 
Manual, but the bulk of the manual provides rules and commentary on international law 
for cyber operations during peacetime.  
During the process to finalize Tallinn 2.0, more than 50 states—including all 
permanent members of the UN Security Council—participated in meetings where they had 
the opportunity to review and comment on the manual’s content.166 While the states’ 
insights are not included in the manual, since it is written from the views of the IGE, 
understanding how each commenting state viewed the implementation of international law 
regarding cyber activity was valuable nonetheless.167 In addition, the IGE sought 
commentary from peer reviews, thus providing a unique, robust source based on 
comprehensive views and expertise. The manual lists all IGE and other participants 
affiliated with the project, including individuals who contributed draft text for 
consideration. The project consisted of editors: legal experts from a wide variety of places 
such as Amsterdam, Tel Aviv, Wuhan (China), the International Law Commission of the 
UN, Tasmania, Tokyo, and the U.S. Department of State; a technical expert from NATO 
CCDCOE, a non-voting observer from NATO; contributors from various U.S. and 
international universities and military institutions; and 58 legal peer reviewers.  
 Tallinn 2.0 is broken into four main parts: general international law and cyberspace, 
specialized regimes of international law and cyberspace, international peace and cyber 
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activities, and the law of cyber armed conflict. Each part is divided into several sections 
with their associated rules. As mentioned previously, LOW/cyber armed conflict as a 
complex space on its own lies beyond the scope of this thesis. In this regard, understanding 
how the IGE restated the definitions of use of force and threat of force to understand the 
proposed limits of that threshold in defining the non-conflict space is important. Part I is 
examined as it relates to the cyber landscape, understanding nation-states, and its 
application to non-state actors. The remaining parts are discussed as they directly relate to 
this thesis in the interest of maintaining a narrow scope. For instance, “Part II: Specialized 
Regimes of International Law and Cyberspace,” is instrumental to understanding the 
restatements of international law as they apply to international human rights law, 
diplomatic and consular law, law of the sea, air law, space law, and international 
communications law. However, a thorough examination of these topics is more conducive 
to an analysis of specialized topic areas for process and procedure development once an 
international governing mechanism is determined and is not within the scope of this thesis. 
“Part I: General International Law and Cyberspace” is essential to the foundation 
of international law, learning the main components of international law, and understanding 
how those components can translate into another domain. Part I consists of sovereignty, 
due diligence, jurisdiction, law of international responsibility, and cyber operations not 
regulated by international law per se.  
1. State Sovereignty in Cyberspace 
In Part I, the IGE examined general principles of sovereignty, violations, sovereign 
immunity, and inviolability. The principle of sovereignty is a key foundational component 
of international law and one that must be critically examined and understood in its 
application to cyberspace. In particular, “states enjoy sovereignty over any cyber 
infrastructure located on their territory and activities associated with that cyber 
infrastructure [emphasis added].”168 Integral to the sovereignty principle is the concept of 
territoriality—the use of physical territory bounds in state strategies to establish 
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jurisdiction. Cyberspace has been considered the fifth domain, joining air, land, sea, and 
space for military operations, but its lack of physical, tangible borders in a virtual realm 
enable it to be analyzed and treated similarly to the law of the seas or outer space. However, 
the Tallinn 2.0 IGE disregarded the borderless arguments and noted that cyber has 
territorial aspects by occurring on physical objects, on existing territories, or as conducted 
by persons or organizations over which nation-states may exercise sovereignty.169 In 
essence, although cyber activity can cross multiple borders, persons within or as part of 
infrastructure subject to the jurisdiction of one or more states conduct it, and therefore the 
principle of sovereignty covers the physical, logical, and social layers of cyberspaces. No 
one state can claim sovereignty over the whole of cyberspace since the majority of a state’s 
cyber infrastructure lies within the bounded territory of the state. 
Tallinn 2.0 Rules 2 and 3 pertain to internal and external sovereignty, which are 
inextricable elements of sovereignty. A state has internal sovereignty over the cyber 
infrastructure, persons, and activities within its territory, unless contradicted by binding 
international law, such as human rights.170 This sovereignty carries legal consequences: 
foremost, a state has domestic and legal regulatory control over all cyber infrastructure, 
activities, and persons within its territory (as previously defined); and second, such 
sovereignty and control affords the state the legal right under international law to protect 
its cyber infrastructure and activity within its territory, irrespective of state or private sector 
nature, natural and legal persons, or even the nationality of the actor.171 A state may restrict 
certain content and impose limitations via domestic laws; however, state censorship of 
cyber activities fall under international human rights law and must not be discriminatory 
or unauthorized, or if it is, be within customary or treaty law. For example, states may not 
exercise their sovereignty over another state’s non-commercial government authorities 
(i.e., heads of state, foreign ministers, or diplomatic personnel).172  
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The IGE leverages the UN Charter principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples. According to Chapter 1, Article 2(1) of the charter, the principle of sovereignty 
applies equally to nation-states, meaning no state has political, personal, or territorial 
supremacy over another state.173 However, the IGE also agreed that sovereignty does not 
apply to international organizations. States are independent and as such, free to engage in 
cyber activities within and beyond their territory so long as they stay in the confines of 
international law. This activity includes entering into or abstaining from cyber agreements 
and treaties. In particular, Rule 3 (2) notes that a state is “not obliged to agree to particular 
treaty rules governing the cyber activities of its organs or nationals or conduct taking place 
in its sovereign territory” as long as another state’s sovereignty is not violated through 
intervention, use of force, or by any other manner.174 
Rules 4 and 5 address violations of one state’s sovereignty by another state. The 
rules aver that any cyber interference by a state with sovereign immunity constitutes a 
violation of sovereignty. Intent is not an element of breach; a state may not intend its 
activities to result in consequences that breach a state’s sovereignty, but nevertheless, 
sovereignty is violated. Rule 4 avers that cyber operations must not “prevent or disregard 
another State’s exercise of its sovereign prerogatives” as they violate state sovereignty and, 
in turn, international law.175 Be aware, however, the IGE agreed the rule only applies to 
states and does not apply to non-state actors unless the non-state activities are attributable 
to the State (i.e., proxy actors).176 Only states must adhere to the principle of sovereignty 
and, therefore, only states can breach the principle of sovereignty; truly non-state actors 
are exempt from this rule. This exemption does not condone their actions or deem them 
lawful; it also does not prevent the violated state from responding to harmful non-state 
cyber activities pursuant to international laws based on plea of necessity, self-defense, or 
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countermeasures as a result of a state’s failure to comply with due diligence in enabling a 
non-state actor to operate within its territory.177  
Certain objects may enjoy sovereign immunity and, in turn, inviolability. 
Leveraging the Law of the Sea Convention, the IGE stated that international law accords 
sovereign immunity to any object, cyber infrastructure, platform, or person devoted 
exclusively to non-commercial, government cyber purposes.178 Despite sovereign 
immunity, the principle of sovereignty in international law applies, particularly the 
obligation to respect the sovereignty of another state. If there is interference or disruption 
of the object, infrastructure, or platform, sovereign immunity is violated. 
2. Due Diligence 
The general international law principle of due diligence must also apply to 
cyberspace. As states are accorded sovereignty as well as immunity in governmental 
situations, so too, must states be responsible to terminate or mitigate harmful activity 
originating within or associated with its territory. Not only must states “exercise due 
diligence in not allowing its territory, or territory or cyber infrastructure under its 
governmental control, to be used for cyber operations that affect the rights of and produce 
adverse consequences for, other states,” the principle also requires states to take all feasible 
measures to end cyber activities that have adverse consequences for other states.179 Once 
a state learns that its territory is being used for activity that is or could cause adverse 
consequences, it is obligated to take measures to stop the activity. Omission—not only 
failure to act but also failure to take effective or sufficient measures when practicable, 
reasonable ones are available and applicable—constitutes a violation of due diligence. 
Since knowledge is a basis for the rule, the IGE opined that states are not obligated to enact 
preventative measures for cyber activities that are unknown to the states or do not yet exist 
as it would be unduly burdensome and unreasonable considering the speed and attribution 
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challenges of cyber operations.180 However, it should be noted that the scope required by 
the principle is unsettled. With savvier technical, intellectual, and financial resources, 
developed states may be better equipped than other states to stop attacks brought to light. 
In addition, the measure of feasibility is dependent on circumstances. For instance, suppose 
the Islamic State is conducting malign cyber activities from within Jordan against France. 
The French are unaware of the activity, but the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate 
is monitoring the activity for intelligence-gathering purposes to effectively foil a terrorist 
plot and further damage. In this case, delay in response outweighs immediate action. In 
another example, if a non-state actor or private company that owns or is in control of the 
platform on which malign cyber activity is being conducted refuses to cooperate with the 
state, unless all feasible measures consistent with international law are exhausted to obtain 
cooperation, the state is still in breach of the principle. The due diligence principle is not 
an obligation of result or ending the harmful activity, but of conduct: acting “diligently in 
its efforts.”181  
3. Jurisdiction 
The principle of jurisdiction, including both territorial and extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in nature, applies over cyber activities and persons the same as it does other 
activities under international law. The general principle of jurisdiction refers to regulation 
of persons, objects, and activities under a state’s national law, with authority over civil, 
criminal, and administrative matters.182 In Rule 9, the IGE stated that territorial 
jurisdiction applies when cyber activities originate, occur, or are completed in a state’s 
territory, or if the cyber activities substantially affect the state’s territory.183 Whereas Rule 
9 addresses activity within a state, Rule 10 addresses external activity and the scope of a 
state’s prescriptive jurisdiction with regard to cyber activities conducted by a state’s 
nationals, committed by foreign nationals against its nationals or to undermine state 
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interests, or that constitutes a crime under the universality principle. Under universality, 
states may extend their jurisdiction over cybercrimes, which are universally recognized, 
regardless of the nationalities of the victims, perpetrators, or location of the offense.184  
The IGE went a step further in distinguishing a state’s domestic jurisdiction in light 
of the global interconnectedness of cyber activities and the issue of intervention via Rules 
66 and 67. Based on the sovereignty principle just discussed, a state is prohibited from 
using cyber means to intervene in another state’s internal or external affairs. What is 
considered to fall under internal affairs—domaine réservé—is broadly interpreted and 
constantly evolves, but the standard are those activities that fall within the prerogatives of 
the states and are not regulated by international law. The domaine réservé may narrow—
although, it does not mean total control relinquishment—as more cyberspace issues 
become regulated under international law. External affairs are also those over which the 
state has prerogative, such as diplomatic and consular relations, international organization 
membership such as the UN or NATO, or entering into international agreements. Like 
sovereignty, the states, the international community, and the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) regularly accept this customary international norm. Under this rule, the “interference” 
or “intervention” must rise by a coercive effect and only pertains to state-to-state activity 
unless a private organization or individual’s cyber actions can be attributed to the state. 
The IGE agreed that the rule has two elements: 
• the cyber act in question must relate to the internal or external affairs 
of the target state; and, 
• the act must be coercive in nature and designed (note, intent) to 
influence or compel an outcome not only via physical use of force, 
but through any affirmative act designed to limit a state’s freedom 
of choice, or to force an involuntary action or non-action of the 
targeted state.185  
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A state has a right to freedom from intervention by the UN for any matter that is 
within the domestic jurisdiction of the state. The rule does not allow for UN interference 
in cyber activities that are purely domestic (i.e., requiring a state to adopt legislation that 
regulates cyber activities that are purely domestic in character). The UN cannot prohibit 
China from entering its citizens’ faces and social credit scores into a database and use the 
information to award benefits or impose punishments. However, this rule does not pertain 
to matters that affect international peace and security or that involve “international 
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character and … human 
rights.”186 These two significant exemptions to Rule 67 afford the UN to intervene and 
opportunity for substantial involvement in cyber issues.  
Effective regulation of cybercrimes demands international cooperation. States are 
not obligated, per Rule 13, to cooperate with other states in domestic cybercrime 
investigations and prosecutions—even transnational in character; however, they may be 
required to if they fall within the scope of a treaty or other international agreement. For 
example, two agreements—the League of Arab States’ Arab Convention on Combatting 
Information Technology Offences and the Council of Europe’s Convention on 
Cybercrime—include international cooperation provisions for mutual assistance to 
investigations or proceedings.187  
International peace and security and cyber activities, Part III, addresses peaceful 
settlement, prohibition of intervention, the use of force, and collective security. Per Rule 
65, “Peaceful Settlement of Disputes,” and as is customary international law through 
multilateral and bilateral treaties, ICJ decisions, and UN resolutions, states must settle 
disputes by peaceful means. This rule applies to actual—and not unforeseeable, 
unmaterialized—international cyber disputes that endanger international peace and 
security. “Peaceful settlement” means solutions through arbitration, mediation, 
negotiation, settlements, arrangements, or any agreed-upon means.188 This rule applies 
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only to international disputes and not to internal, domestic ones. A “dispute” for purposes 
of this rule must rise to a “disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views 
or interests between parties … [and] comprise a specific claim by one state that is rejected 
by another.”189 
For this thesis, it is important to note the IGE’s stance on determining whether 
transnational cyber disputes between a state and non-state actor constitute international 
disputes for the purpose of peaceful settlement. Rule 65 is based on UN Charter Articles 
2(3) and 33(1).190 The majority of experts agreed that this rule only applies to disputes 
between states, leveraging UN Charter Article 2(4) and Tallinn 2.0 Rule 68, which 
prohibits use-of-force by states against non-state actors. Any disputes with non-state actors 
should be settled in the spirit of the law, by peaceful means. Another notable aspect of the 
rule is the concept of good faith: states should not obstruct settlement through lies, delays, 
omissions, or any other means.191 A state is not acting in good faith if, in its attempt to 
settle a cyber dispute involving proxy actors, the state denies any involvement when, in 
fact, the proxies were acting under that state’s arm.  
The process of peaceful settlement occurs until there is no reasonable resolution; 
means to negotiate have to be exhausted. Once those efforts fail, the dispute may be 
elevated to the UN Security Council and General Assembly.192  
C. BUDAPEST CONVENTION 
The Geneva Conventions, UN Charter, and the Council of European Convention 
on Cybercrime (also known as the “Budapest Convention”) are existing international 
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instruments that could affect norms of conduct, law enforcement, investigation, security, 
and various agreements related to the cyber domain as long as there is cooperation with 
signatories. As cyber technology advances, jurisdictional boundaries may shift or remain 
unknown, affecting law enforcement jurisdiction to handle cybercrimes. The Budapest 
Convention is a step towards international cooperative governance solution for cyberspace. 
The treaty was opened for signature in 2001 and entered into force on January 7, 2004. It 
is the first international treaty on cybercrime that includes copyright infringement, child 
pornography, network security violations, computer-related fraud, and any other crimes 
committed via computer networks and the internet. Per the treaty’s preamble, the fight 
against cybercrime requires international cooperation through a common criminal policy 
by the adoption of appropriate legislation by each state party to the convention.193 Party 
states are joined by international organizations, such as the EU, International Criminal 
Police Organization (INTERPOL), and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, which 
participate as members or observers on the Cybercrime Convention Committee.  
The treaty is broken into four chapters— terms and definitions; domestic (state) 
level substantive law and procedural law; general principles relating to international co-
operation; and, final clauses. The substantive criminal law articles address offenses and 
conduct—committed intentionally and without right—to include data and system 
interference, computer-related forgery and fraud, child pornography, copyright 
infringements, and corporate liability. The chapter also includes a provision averring that 
each state, within its adopted legislation, shall include measures that are “punishable by 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, which include deprivation of liberty.”194 
The procedural law chapter addresses the scope of procedural provisions, specifically that 
each party shall ensure power and procedures are subject to conditions and safeguards 
under each state’s domestic law, which “shall provide for the adequate protection of human 
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rights and liberties.”195 A critical element to cyber governance discussions is that of 
jurisdiction, which is established when the offense is committed in the state’s territory, on 
board a ship or aircraft registered to the state, by a state’s national, or under existing 
criminal jurisdiction in accordance with a state’s domestic law.196  
Barnes succinctly summarized the crux of the convention in his thesis, stating that 
member nation-states shall adopt their legislation according to the following guidelines:  
• Every network has a base level of authorized access. Entities that exceed 
that level of authorized access violate the law.  
• Preventing access to or damaging data and/or computer networks is 
counterproductive to the free sharing of information and should be 
punished appropriately.  
• Although digital devices allow the ubiquitous copying of intellectual 
property, they do not obliterate intellectual property protections. 
Nations should ensure entities respect intellectual property rights.  
• Illicit images of children are inherently wrong. Nations should prosecute 
entities that publish and distribute such images.  
• Parties that subscribe to the treaty shall cooperate with other nations to 
enforce these principles and share information pursuant to the 
appropriate legal measure to allow the extradition and prosecution of 
perpetrators of acts contrary to those provisions.  
• Criminal liability does not attach to measures used for the protection of 
computers and computer networks. 
• The European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC) shall settle 
disputes between signatories.197 
Capacity building—reinforcing criminal justice capacities for cybercrimes—has 
been a topic in Budapest Convention conversations. Alexander Seger avers the Budapest 
Convention is part of a “dynamic triangle” for cybercrime success supported by capacity-
building programs. This triangle consists of the Budapest Convention, the Cybercrime 
Convention Committee, and the Council of Europe’s Cybercrime Programme Office (C-
PROC) that was established in Bucharest, Romania, for worldwide capacity building. The 
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C-PROC supports the “implementation of the Budapest Convention as well as 
recommendations of the Cybercrime Convention Committee; and at the same time, the 
experience of capacity building program [s] is fed back into the Committee and the further 
evolution of the Convention.”198 Capacity building through bilateral cooperation is an 
essential ongoing process to apply cyber best practices at a global level through which the 
Budapest Convention provides an existing framework to leverage.  
A problem that currently arises in the newer cyber domain can be seen with the 
Budapest Convention: the U.S. ratified the agreement but China is not a signatory, deeming 
the convention unsuccessful to critics.199 Countries such as China have been resistant to 
applying current international law to cyber issues, arguing that the cyber domain is a new 
realm that requires different rules; however, the notion of rules of conduct and legitimate 
behavior continue to be discussions of interest.200  
D. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military defensive alliance 
whose member states agree to mutual and collective defense and respond to attacks by 
external entities. The cornerstone of NATO is Article 5, which states that an attack of one 
NATO member is an attack on all of its members. Article 5 has been invoked only once 
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. On September 12, 2001, Article 5 was invoked by the NATO 
Alliance and on October 2, 2001, NATO’s North Atlantic Council determined that Article 
5 did apply to the attacks.201 The Article 5 invocation demonstrated collected defense 
support by NATO members for the United States, taking a united stand against the terrorist 
attacks. As a result, NATO agreed to eight support measures including NATO military 
asset surveillance and air support, increased security for U.S. facilities, and readiness for 
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naval, air, and ground deployment support.202 The Alliance currently has 29 members with 
membership open to “any other European state in a position to further principles of [Article 
10 of the North Atlantic Treaty] and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic 
area.”203 Within NATO’s organizational structure, the parties with the most influence and 
responsibility for advancing the international cyber governance agenda on the Civilian 
Structure would be the NATO Secretary General, Emerging Security Challenges Division, 
Defence Policy and Planning Division, Joint Intelligence, and Security Division; the Allied 
Command Transformation (ACT) and Allied Command Operations (ACO) influence the 
Military Structure. The Secretary General is NATO’s top international civil servant, head 
of NATO’s international organizational staff, and chief spokesperson responsible for 
“steering the process of consultation and decision-making in the Alliance and ensuring that 
decisions are implemented.”204 As cyber threats evolve, the frequency and complexity 
increases by which they impact Alliance networks. As a result, cyber is a NATO core task 
of its collective defense to enhance cyber resiliency and security across the Alliance.  
The 2014 NATO Wales Summit reached a consensus that cyberspace should be 
governed by international law. However, no additional action has been pursued. In its 
December 2019 London Declaration, NATO recognized the rising strategic threats and 
challenges to transatlantic cyber security and rules-based international order emanating 
from states such as Russia, China, and non-state actors including terrorists, averring 
cooperative progress with the UN and NATO-EU relations.205 Improved collaborative 
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efforts between intelligence and Centres of Excellence will support the international 
regulatory evolution and development of a governance framework.  
Since September 2014, NATO has made cyber defense, resilience, training, and 
education main foci and core tasks of its collective defense through its NATO Policy on 
Cyber Defence (updated and endorsed in February 2017), its 2016 Cyber Defence Pledge, 
recognition of cyberspace as a military domain, and through its affirmation that existing 
international laws apply to state activity in the cyber landscape during peacetime and 
conflict. However, NATO has not been able to sufficiently unravel the gray area containing 
how the international laws apply or how they apply to non-state and proxy-state actors. The 
Alliance has intensified its commitment to preparedness, mitigation, and recovery from 
cyberattacks through enhanced information sharing with partners and industry through 
vehicles such as the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership, the NATO-EU Technical 
Arrangement on Cyber Defence (February 2016), NATO Cyber Rapid Reaction teams, and 
a new Cyberspace Operations Centre as part of its Command Structure.206 Senior NATO 
and EU officials met in Brussels on December 17, 2019, to discuss enhanced security 
efforts and cyber-security initiatives as a strategic issue of common interest to promote 
stability between nation-states.207 The following cyber initiatives and efforts will play 
crucial roles in non-state cyber governance: 
• NATO Industry Cyber Partnership (NICP): This partnership 
recognized that industry is a key component in the cyber domain, whose 
capabilities and cooperation are crucial to NATO’s and allies’ Enhanced 
Cyber Defence Policy’s objectives, including information sharing, 
prevention, mitigation, and response to cyber threats and 
vulnerabilities.208 
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• 2016 Cyber Defense Pledge: Each NATO member and ally agreed to make 
cyber defense a priority, separately and collectively as part of hybrid 
campaigns to “improve resiliency” and respond to cyberattacks.209  
• NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC): NCIRC, 
which is a subset of the NATO Communications and Information Agency 
(NCI Agency) Cyber Security (CS) Service Line (SL), provides cyber 
specialist services—such as development of new technology and innovation 
in CIS Security, Cyber Defense, Information Assurance, Computer Security 
& Communications Security—for the prevention, detection, response, and 
recovery from cyber security incidents.210 
• Memorandum of Understanding on Cyber Defence: This MOU between 
NATO and 28 Allied cyber defense authorities was developed in 2015. 
• NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP): The NDPP is a five-step 
process—establish political guidance, determine requirements, apportion 
requirements and set targets, facilitate implementation, and review results—
focused on military and non-military cyber capabilities interoperability and 
standardization.211 The NDPP’s aim is to provide NATO allies a common 
framework to harmonize defense activities utilizing cyber capabilities in the 
most effective ways without compromising nation-state sovereignty.212 
Fourteen planning domains are involved in minimizing duplicity and 
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maximizing cohesion in capability development.213 Allies provide data 
every two years to update NDPP plans and policies. 
• Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defence: This February 10, 2016, 
agreement between the NCIRC and the Computer Emergency Response 
Team for the EU Institutions, bodies and agencies (CERT-EU), provides a 
“framework for exchanging information and sharing best practices between 
emergency response teams” to augment cyber defense capabilities.214 This 
arrangement is part of the collaborative work NATO does with the EU, UN, 
Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe.215  
• NATO Cyber Education Institutions: These institutions comprise the 
Communications and Information Systems School (Latina, Italy), NATO 
School (Oberammergau, Germany), NATO Defense College (Rome, Italy), 
and NATO CCDCOE. A critical component of NATO’s cyber education is 
hosting recurring exercises, such as the annual Cyber Coalition Exercise, 
which integrates cyber defense and security elements into Alliance 
training.216 
• NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence: The NATO 
CCDCOE is a NATO-accredited cyber research and training facility—not 
part of the NATO Command Structure—that offers expertise on cyber 
defense and security issues.217 Distinguishing between peacetime and 
wartime is important, as both areas are still heavily being explored and have 
many gaps. The Tallinn Manual was developed between 2009 and 2012 to 
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make rules about certain aspects of international law—jus ad bellum, jus in 
bello, and international humanitarian law—that apply to cyber conflicts and 
cyber warfare.218 Tallinn Manual 2.0, published in 2017, expanded on the 
original edition Tallinn Manual with analysis of cyber incidents that fall 
below the threshold for use of force as a resource for peacetime rather than 
cyber warfare/armed conflict. Both manuals resulted from the academic, 
non-binding studies and discussions by an independent group of 
international renowned legal experts at the behest of the NATO CCDCOE 
in Tallinn, Estonia. The CCDCOE is a NATO-accredited group of experts 
from 25 countries who support NATO-member nations with cyber 
technology and legal strategy, research, and training to “address the 
growing relevance of potential threats within the cyber domain.” 219 The 
CCDCOE is not directly funded by nor part of the command structure of 
NATO; its role is to support the NATO Alliance through its specialized 
cyber functional area. The non-binding Tallinn Manuals follow the paths of 
other non-binding productions such as the International Institute of 
Humanitarian Law’s San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to 
Armed Conflicts at Sea and the Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy 
and Conflict Research’s Manual on International Law Applicable to Air 
and Missile Warfare.  
E. THE UNITED NATIONS 
The UN Charter, signed on June 26, 1945, and in effect since October 24, 1945, 
provides principles and obligations for its members and non-members as applicable for 
maintenance of international peace and security. Article 106 reinforces that member parties 
to the Four-Nation Declaration (the United States, the United Kingdom, the former Soviet 
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Union, and China), which was signed at the Moscow Conference on October 30, 1943, and 
France, must consult with one another as is necessary to “maintaining international peace 
and security.”220 
The UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in Field of Information 
and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security recognized the relevance 
of the UN Charter’s prohibition on use of force in cyberspace; however, the group requires 
further studies to understand the application of the prohibition as well as the norms of 
international law.221  
1. UN Security Council 
The UN Security Council is the main UN body responsible for maintaining 
international peace and security. The council consists of 15 members, each with one 
representative/one vote allocated to it. The United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, 
China, and France are the five permanent members (known as the P5) that have UN 
resolution veto power and 10 members are elected by a two-thirds vote of the General 
Assembly for two-year nonconsecutive terms but not afforded resolution veto power.222 
In terms of the veto power, Russia has used it the most, followed by the United States, and 
then, China. Any UN but non-council member may participate in discussions for issues 
that affect that UN member nation.223 The Security Council has a right to mandate and 
authorize measures, should it find any cyber activity it deems an act of aggression, threat, 
or breach to international peace and security. Per chapter 7 of the UN Charter, once the 
council adopts a binding resolution—for example, deny access to cyber communications 
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from one state—all states must adopt and adhere to its decisions.224 A state’s compliance 
with such a mandate will not be in violation of the rule against intervention.225  
The UN Secretary General sponsors the annual Internet Governance Forum in 
accordance with the mandate set out in the “Tunis Agenda for the Information Society,” a 
2005 publication from the World Summit on the Information Society. This forum focuses 
around the consensus that global internet governance should be a multilateral and 
transparent process, a core focus for all nation governments, international organizations, 
the private sector, and individual citizens to provide a stable and secure cyberspace. This 
consensus is further support for the approach taken in this paper. 
A main limitation of the UN Security Council is the membership of China and 
Russia as permanent seats. These two P5 countries skillfully use procedural rules and 
tactics to sway the UN in their favor and promote their agenda, even if the result can have 
dire consequences. An example is the recent Russia-supported UN cybercrime resolution, 
“Countering the Use of Information and Communications Technologies for Criminal 
Purposes” that was passed November 18, 2019.   
2. The International Court of Justice 
The ICJ is the principal judicial structure of the United Nations per Article 92 of 
the UN Charter and based on the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. 
UN Members are ipso facto parties to the ICJ and non-members may, by determination and 
recommendation by the General Assembly through the Security Council, become a party 
to the ICJ.226 Members are not required to take their cases to the ICJ. They are authorized 
to use other agreements, whether in existence, planned, or tribunals; however, if they 
choose to bring a case to the ICJ, the parties must comply with the decision, with any 
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recourse for party noncompliance elevated to the Security Council for judgment.227 An 
important aspect of the ICJ to consider in the international governance analysis is the 
court’s ability to provide advisory opinions on any legal question not only to the General 
Assembly or Security Council but also to other UN bodies or specialized agencies.228  
F. CONCLUSION 
Chapter III provided an overview of the critical cyber concepts and legal principles 
embodied in interpretations of ROE, the Budapest Convention, and through restatements 
of law in Tallinn 2.0. The chapter concluded with an overview of the applicable cyber 
functions provided by the UN and NATO. It is important for the reader to understand these 
concepts and organizational contributions as integral aspects of cyber governance, peace, 
and security. Chapter III provided an essential knowledge foundation leading into Chapter 
IV’s regulatory mechanism analysis.  
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IV. IS NATO CCDCOE THE RIGHT ENTITY TO 
ARBITRATE CONFLICT IN THE CYBER DOMAIN? 
The NATO CCDCOE, leveraging the Budapest Convention framework, is not the 
correct regulatory entity for international governance of non-state actors—or any actors—
in the cyber domain. One governing entity is not a sufficient approach for dispute 
resolution. The majority of today’s malicious cyber activities consist of spreading false 
information, stealing personal data, or breaching government systems. These actions pose 
a direct threat to the public and private sectors, nation-states, and the international 
community. Cyberattacks by non-state actors have evolved with the speed of technology 
development, leaving governments powerless to address the threat due to a lack of legal 
options to regulate non-state actors. To adequately address the threat, the international 
community must form legally binding mechanisms to pursue non-state actors similar to the 
way the world rethought terrorism and the threats posed to national security interests after 
9/11. Although ambiguity surrounds the application of international law in cyberspace, 
collective action founded in legal principles that could provide cyber-victim recourse 
options should be a priority of the international community. 
A one-stop shop is a cyber-governance paradise, the ideal destination. 
Unfortunately, the current—and indeterminate future—landscape is too complex an 
environment to be solved with the press of an “easy button.” For example, if the United 
States decided to leverage the full capabilities of the government to include intelligence, 
military and law enforcement, what risks does the United States run in pursuing, exposing, 
and responding to an attack? Is the United States willing to expose its capabilities to the 
public in pursuit of the perpetrators of the attack? Is it worth exposing sensitive collection 
capabilities or embarrassing an ally who may have inadvertently been used as an 
accomplice? These were the challenges that the U.S. government faced in response to the 
2016 election interference. What are a private corporation’s financial risks if it reveals 
publicly it has been a victim of cybercrime? Indeed, each situation will force difficult 
challenges for the involved victims and nation-states attempting to combat the threat, which 
is why the issue must be elevated and addressed within the international community. As 
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our understanding of the cyberspace matures, standards and norms backstopped by 
international law should also mature and evolve to address the regulatory requirements.  
This thesis centers on Barnes’s recommended future course of study to elevate the 
NATO CCDCOE to a formal arbitrating body using the Budapest Convention as a 
framework. Barnes’s designation of the CCDCOE is based on the its history with 
cybersecurity; specifically, its IGE that interpreted and restated international law—
captured in the Tallinn Manuals—as applied to the cyber domain. Barnes’s argument is 
that by empowering the CCDCOE to mitigate cyber disputes, information sharing will be 
easier while at the same time making it harder for “enemies to remain anonymous.”229 In 
addition to stating that the U.S. Executive Branch should work with international partners 
to determine the best active cyber defense measures in accordance with ACDA, he avers 
the branch also has an integral role in modifying the NATO charter to enable and allow for 
the CCDCOE to continue its Tallinn 2.0 legal analysis and to develop into a governance 
body responsible for dispute mitigation and resolution.230  
Barnes’s recommendation is flawed for two reasons: the CCDCOE is not the 
appropriate regulatory mechanism and the framework should include Tallinn Manual 2.0 
restatements of law in addition to the Budapest Convention. The CCDCOE is comprised 
of the expertise necessary to weigh on disputes concerning conflicts and violations of 
international law; however, a group composed of attorneys, academics, and cyber 
professionals who developed nonbinding manuals will be perceived has having weak 
authority to resolve disputes. Even if a convention is created to statutorily elevate the 
Centre CCDCOE to an arbitrating body, cyberspace is a complex domain that requires 
more than a simple, one-body entity as a regulatory solution. The Budapest Convention is 
an ideal framework for addressing cybercrime both unilaterally and bilaterally due to 
its extradition principles and procedures. However, its effectiveness will be lost if it is  
used alone and relied on as the sole framework to address international governance of  
non-state actors.  
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Barnes drives the discussion in a promising direction: the NATO CCDCOE 
expertise and the Budapest Convention should be leveraged in the development of 
a regulatory mechanism but, at present, it needs to be a multilateral, multipronged 
approach. This approach should consider the Paris Climate Agreement Model and  
Tallinn Manual 2.0 with the Budapest Convention as a framework, and encompass 
multilateral processes through the UN, NATO, INTERPOL, and unilateral state processes 
(e.g., United States only).  
A. THE PARIS CLIMATE AGREEMENT MODEL 
One of the main challenges in developing an international cyber governing 
mechanism is obtaining consensus among the cybersphere of parties. The international 
community should follow the recent Paris Climate Agreement (also referred to as “Paris 
Agreement”) as a model for success in garnering support for a major global initiative. The 
agreement, adopted in 2015 and made effective November 2016, was designed to improve 
on and replace the Kyoto Protocol, a 2005 treaty to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The 
Paris Agreement—part of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)—is a landmark treaty. As of February 2020, 189 (including the EU) out of the 
197 parties have ratified to the treaty.231 Only eight countries in the world have signed but 
not yet ratified: Angola, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, South Sudan, Turkey, and Yemen.232 
The UNFCCC serves as the “foundation for intergovernmental action to combat climate 
change and its impacts on humanity and ecosystems” with the Paris Agreement building 
upon the convention to achieve a common goal to reduce global temperature rise and bring 
temperatures below pre-industrial times.233  
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To effectively follow this model, global leaders would need to collectively agree 
that characteristic malign cyber activities are driven by state, proxy, or non-state actors; 
those activities are a threat to the cyber environment and all of humanity, and that 
international action is required to halt it. In addition, a clear framework must be created for 
all countries to make commitments to reduce malign cyber activities that occur within or 
are associated with their state, according to the legal framework that follows, to include 
non-state activities. Finally, the parties to a similar cyber model would need to make a 
commitment to strengthen international governance of cyberspace over time.  
Key Paris Agreement takeaways that should be applied to a cyber governance 
model include: 
• A clear, well-defined technology and legal framework.  
• Enhanced capacity building framework supporting action by 
developing and vulnerable countries. This takeaway supports the issue 
raised in Chapter III, Section B.2, that undeveloped states may suffer more 
attacks because they are not well equipped or they may not be in compliance 
with regulation because they do not have the financial, personnel, or 
technological resources to do so.  
• Enhanced transparency of action and support through a more robust 
transparency framework. The heart of the Paris Agreement is its reliable, 
transparent, and comprehensive reporting requirements to achieve its goals. 
All parties must communicate on their adaptation, implementation, and 
mitigation efforts through nationally determined contributions (NDC) and 
an assessment every five years to evaluate the collective progress toward 
achieving the agreement’s purpose.234 Each party agrees to regularly 
“prepare, communicate, and maintain successive nationally determined 
contributions (NDCs) that it intends to achieve,” with a plan tailored to the 
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country’s current capabilities and existing domestic conditions to ensure 
adequate compliance and forward-moving direction toward the agreement’s 
objectives.235 In addition, an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris 
Agreement (APA) was established at the same time as the agreement to 
provide guidance as well as share general expectations and understanding 
of the work required by the parties to the Paris Agreement.236 Leveraging 
this model, a similar Ad Hoc Working Group on Cyber Governance should 
be established at the same time, or before, a governance framework and 
process is developed. The Paris Agreement demonstrates that global 
warming can only be mitigated with global action. Cyber governance 
requires a carbon copy response by establishing legally binding measures 
in a comprehensive treaty that includes monitoring, reporting, and 
assessment requirements. Such a cyber treaty will not be the ultimate 
answer to cyberspace regulation; however, there needs to be a solid floor 
before the cyber governance ceiling can be reached. 
B. FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPING LEGAL STANDARDS 
An effective framework for international governance during peacetime of non-state 
actors requires the Budapest Convention and the Tallinn Manual 2.0 restatements of the 
law, in addition to the manual’s commentary. The analysis in this thesis demonstrates that 
Barnes is correct in his assertion that the Budapest Convention should be leveraged. The 
convention’s framework should be used for all criminal activity and expanded as necessary 
as the cyberspace evolves. As mentioned in Chapter III, Section C, the convention allows 
for amendments as well as for additional parties. The most recent amendment, the 2006 
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, was created to extend the Budapest 
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Convention’s scope through criminalization of racist and xenophobic cyber activities and 
threats using computer systems.237  
The convention also has a built-in working group to provide guidance, assessment, 
and strategic direction as well as appropriate amendments. Through Article 46, the 
Cybercrime Convention Committee is the quality control mechanism through which parties 
to the convention “consult periodically … with a view to facilitating … the effective use 
and implementation of the Convention, the exchange of information, and the consideration 
of possible supplementation or amendment of the Convention.”238 As cyberspace is 
defined, the Budapest Convention should be amended to include a wider range of 
cybercriminal and other non-state cyber activities.  
In addition to the convention, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 should be a focal component 
of the framework. In consideration of cyberspace’s rapid evolution and key players, the 
manual’s restatements of law should be expanded to include non-state activity, either 
through attribution or forensic analysis, to associate them with a state, for international law 
application. The principles of sovereignty, due diligence, and jurisdiction will be a 
foundation to the framework. As the restatements are translated into binding law, the 
principle of sovereignty—and thereby, attribution—will be a main factor in non-state 
governance. It is clear that sovereignty applies only to states. However, Tallinn 2.0 Rules 
1, 2, and 3 provide wiggle room for internal and external sovereignty over non-state actors 
based on the person’s location or infrastructure used in the cyber activity. A state could 
also be held in violation of a non-state activity if it did not terminate or mitigate the harmful 
activity within its jurisdiction or associated with its territory, per the international law 
principle of due diligence. The manual’s restatements will not provide a blanket solution 
for a binding legal framework because, in its current state, the manual is comprised of non-
binding expert opinions. However, the restatements provide a comprehensive guide to 
replicate or refine existing legal principles understood by the global community. 
 
237 Council of Europe, “Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, Concerning the 
Criminalization of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed Through Computer Systems,” ETS 
No. 89, January 3, 2006, https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/189. 
238 “T-CY Work Plan for the Period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2019,” Council of Europe, 
November 27, 2018, https://rm.coe.int/t-cy-2018-27-tcy-workplan-v6adopted/16808febc6. 
81 
C. MULTI-PRONGED APPROACH FOR CYBER GOVERNANCE 
Numerous stakeholders influence cyber strategies in the United States and 
internationally. A one-system regulatory mechanism will not be an effective measure for 
international cyber governance. Rather, a multi-pronged, multilateral, and unified approach 
—with concession by a majority of the international cyber community—is preferred to 
achieve the greatest success.239 Cyber governance success would be measured on the 
ability to hold a cyber actor(s) responsible for malign activity, whether it is an individual, 
transnational organization, or—at the highest level—a nation-state. See Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. Steps in Accountability for Malign Activity  
The purpose of this recommended approach is not to provide the ultimate solution; 
it is to provide the international community with a course of action to consider in 
developing a regulatory mechanism. The United States will benefit most from driving the 
discussions and leading the process development. This process requires classification on 
some level, whether known outright or through forensic analysis, to attribute the activity 
to a non-state, proxy, or nation-state actor. Following in the path of the Paris Agreement, 
the approach should begin with defining cyberspace as it applies to non-state actors and 
garnering global support through a clear, well-defined framework to design a treaty. Once 
 
239 It is well understood that international governance will never be purely unified, as there will 
always be states—adversaries to Western countries, for example—who disagree with regulatory measures 
that do not support their policies that are information-restrictive or limit cyberspace access to its civilians.  
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signatories and ratification take place, the multi-pronged approach will include NATO, 
INTERPOL, and unilateral processes.  
Figure 12 proposes the multipronged approach and is discussed further in this 
chapter. 
 
Figure 12. Recommended Governance Approach 
1. Defining the Space via the UN  
The UN should be charged with the challenge of defining cyberspace and 
establishing binding legal documents for the multilateral, multi-pronged approach by 
leveraging the international community’s cyber experts and modeling existing treaties. 
When defining the space, the UN should present a course of action referencing the Outer 
Space Treaty within the Budapest-Tallinn- cyber framework. The Outer Space Treaty 
model is based on a non-armament treaty for international cooperation to maintain a 
peaceful outer space to limit damage from self-serving exploitation of the new domain. 
The 1967 “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies” seeks to protect space 
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use and exploration through demilitarization for the benefit of all humanity, in the interests 
of all countries, in accordance with international law.240 Per Article VI, the Outer Space 
Treaty mandates that state parties to the treaty have the international responsibility for all 
activities that occur in outer space (including the moon and other celestial bodies), whether 
conducted by governmental or non-governmental entities.241 Defining a cyberspace 
governance process in a similar manner to account for non-state actors will be beneficial 
in addressing a major area of cyber activities. The UN should provide clarity regarding 
information flows and determining the correct pathway or prong(s) to pursue against non-
state actors, which may be case dependent as governance matures. The process should be 
made enforceable by a treaty based on the recommended Budapest-Tallinn legal 
framework, models, and multi-pronged approach, as discussed. The treaty should be 
flexible, allowing for amendments that account for various types of non-state and other 
cyber activities as the cyberspace evolves.  
2. Diplomatic Approaches 
There are two types of diplomatic approaches to consider when developing the 
multi-pronged methodology: multilateralism and unilateralism. Simply put, 
multilateralism is acting in cooperation with other states or international organizations; 
unilateralism is a state acting on its own without international support.242 Unilateralism 
often has negative connotations in international relations when states act with disregard for 
other states. However, in this multi-pronged approach, unilateralism is used positively 
regarding self-defense. The Budapest Convention also affords unilateral action for 
cybercrimes. As mentioned throughout this paper, international cooperation is necessary 
for cyber governance success. Which multilateral mechanism is used will depend on the 
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type of activity and process defined by the UN using the Budapest-Tallinn legal 
framework. 
3. Response Capabilities in a Defined Cyber Environment 
Regional alliances, NATO, and INTERPOL have capabilities that aid in cyber 
conflict resolution, mitigation, and cyber incident responses. These unions and 
organizations should be involved in cyber governance processes to ensure a robust, 
comprehensive approach to maintaining international cyber peace and security.  
a. Regional Alliances 
Regional alliances are political and economic unions based within geographic 
areas, to include the EU, the African Union (AU), and the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC). The EU is the most recognizable alliance, currently consisting of 27 member 
countries and exists to “enhance economic, social and territorial cohesion and solidarity 
among EU countries” through trade, diplomacy, security, and technological progress.243 
The AU, created in 2002, is a regional organization of 55 member countries that focuses 
on increased cooperation between African nations for economic growth through conflict 
resolution, crisis management, and promoting peace and security.244 Its constitutive 
aims include international cooperation, promoting peace, security, and stability on the 
continent, and establishing a role in international negotiations.245 The GCC is a regional 
effort that was established in 1981 with six Middle Eastern member states—Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman—to develop and 
maintain coordination, cooperation, and technological progress for Arab regional 
unity.246 Critical cyber governance responses at the regional alliance prong could be 
intelligence sharing and military response, whether it is a standalone force or leveraging 
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member states’ capabilities. The EU, for instance, does not have its own military force 
but instead relies on the military capabilities of other member states. The African 
Standby Force, under the AU’s direction, is comprised of military, police, and civilians 
to respond to international and continental crises.247 The GCC created its own military 
bridge, the Peninsular Shield Forces, which was disbanded in 2006.248  
The type of force would depend on the action and how the space is defined by 
the UN. Including regional alliances as a facet of a multipronged approach is important 
because it ensures mutual interests and benefits of the world’s key players, regional 
relationships, and emerging powers all have a role in international cooperation and 
governance.  
b. INTERPOL 
INTERPOL provides a criminal cooperation and investigative support 
mechanism that should be leveraged by nation-states as part of a multi-pronged response 
to non-state cyber incidents. INTERPOL is an intergovernmental organization with 194 
member countries that connects and coordinates with international police networks 
through data sharing and technical and operational support.249 INTERPOL could have 
a key role in governance of non-state cyber actors, specifically with pursuing the 
detention and transfer of custody of cybercriminals and terrorists.250 INTERPOL aids 
in terrorism cases through intelligence sharing, providing data that identifies suspects 
and prevents terrorist travel, and assisting with financial and social media analyses. 
INTERPOL has regional and international strategic partnerships to aid in combatting 
terrorism.  
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The organization also provides investigative support for cybercrime—“pure 
cybercrime”—which is referred to as “crimes against computers and information 
systems, where the aim is to gain unauthorized access to a device or deny access to a 
legitimate user… [and] cyber-enabled,” traditional crimes such as theft, fraud, and 
illegal gambling that are accomplished via the internet.251 INTERPOL’s cyber 
operations, investigative support, training, and partnerships complement the 
international law enforcement community. The investigative and intelligence support 
element that INTERPOL could provide to cybercrime and cyberterrorism is an integral 
component of a multi-pronged governance approach, especially regarding non-state 
cyber activities.  
c. NATO 
NATO provides a collective defense response option, including military and 
intelligence sharing. Invoking Article 5 should be an option if a cyberattack is conducted 
on a NATO alliance member and thereby treated as an attack on all members of the 
alliance. If, based on the defined cyberspace and Budapest-Tallinn legal framework, it 
is determined that Article 5 applies to cyber activities, then it could also be invoked 
against non-state cyber actions. The only time Article 5 was invoked was after the 9/11 
terrorist (non-state actors) attacks. Based on the application of the article to this event, 
a cyberattack against one could be deemed an attack against all and appropriate measures 
would follow per NATO’s collective defense responses. It is imperative that the space 
is clearly defined in order to determine the threshold at which Article 5 can be invoked 
in the cybersphere. It will be a case-by-case determination, so clarity is required to avoid 
reckless, retaliatory cyber behavior by alliance members. 
In addition to Article 5, NATO offers several other platforms that can be 
leveraged based on the non-state cyber activity conducted. The international cyber 
governance approach can include NATO’s strategic initiatives discussed in Chapter III, 
Section D: NATO Industry Cyber Partnership (NICP), NCIRC, and its Technical 
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Arrangement on Cyber Defence. These initiatives provide mechanisms for detection, 
response, and recovery from cyber incidents. In addition, NATO can provide legal and 
technical cyber expertise to the governance structure through its Cyber Education 
Institutions and the NATO CCDCOE.  
Although the CCDCOE should not be the sole governing body, it should still 
play an important role in cyber governance due to its ties with the Tallinn Manuals and 
its legal expertise. The CCDCOE specializes in cyber issues and, as subject matter 
experts in the cyber field, distributes its expertise through consultation, doctrine, 
training, seminars, best practices and lessons learned. In addition to supporting NATO 
and partner countries with its in-depth knowledge, the CCDCOE helps to expand 
interoperability and increase capabilities for augmentation in the cyber domain. 
CCDCOE membership is open to all NATO nations and welcomes contributing 
participants, including non-NATO nations, academic and research institutions, and 
corporations.  
d. United States 
As previously mentioned, the United States has a unilateral response option in 
addition to the multilateral response options. If the United States is acting in self-defense 
to a non-state cyber action, it can resort to unilateralism by using the Budapest-Tallinn 
legal framework or its own domestic legislation. Examples of this type of response 
include diplomacy, military action, intelligence sharing and operations, law enforcement 
and investigations, and sanctions. In addition, the United States can designate terrorist 
organizations, which would open up additional response options such as prosecution of 
U.S. persons for providing terrorist support. While the international community 
develops and defines cyberspace regulatory mechanisms, the United States should 
address issues unilaterally if it is not only in the nation’s best interests but also in the 
whole-of-cyberspace’s interests to disrupt, mitigate, or remedy a malign non-state cyber 
activity.  
The analysis in this thesis reveals that Barnes was heading in the right direction 
by elevating the NATO CCDCOE as a governing body; however, the complex cyber 
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environment requires a multi-pronged, multilateral approach. His recommendation for 
the Budapest Convention as a framework should be satisfied in conjunction with the 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 restatements and commentary. The best way to achieve effective 
governance, though, will be to also follow the Paris Climate Agreement model, leverage 
the Outer Space Treaty, and utilize the international cyber leaders and experts to define 
a regulatory path. This is only the tip of the iceberg; cyber governance will not be 
resolved in a short time. However, the intent of this recommended approach is to foster 
dialogue and creativity in further developing a solution.  
4. Legal Venues 
Under the proposed multi-pronged approach, if non-state cyber conflicts cannot 
be handled multilaterally through the UN Security Council, unilaterally, or through the 
treaty developed as part of the multi-pronged approach in accordance with the Budapest-
Tallinn legal framework, an international court may be an option. Two courts to examine 
as venues are the ICJ and the International Criminal Court (ICC). As mentioned earlier, 
the ICJ is available to UN and approved non-UN members for advisory opinions on any 
legal question—and this could include cyber—especially if the UN includes it in the 
defined framework. The ICJ thus could be a feasible venue for non-state cyber cases.  
The ICC, created under the 1998 Rome Statute, investigates grave crimes 
including crimes against humanity and of aggression.252 The scope of the ICC’s 
jurisdiction is narrow and “confined to declarative and symbolic force.”253 The ICC 
added the crime of aggression in July 2018. An act of aggression is one that is a 
“manifest” violation of the UN Charter measured by “its character, gravity, and scale” 
and that targets state senior officials by a perpetrator who is “in a position effectively to 
exercises control over or to direct the political or military action of the State which 
committed the act” and the ICC will only have jurisdiction between ratified state 
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parties.254 Unless non-state cyber activity is escalated to a grave action that can be tied 
to a physical act of genocide, result in a crime against humanity such as enforced 
disappearance or torture, or a breach of the Geneva convention as translated to cyber 
activities (above the threshold of war), the ICC is currently not an appropriate venue for 
non-state cyber cases. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The technology age is dynamic, innovative, and expanding each year. International 
and U.S. cyber strategies, including regulatory measures, need to keep pace if superiority 
in cyber domain governance is a priority objective. In this new domain, our adversaries 
assert their influence over U.S. citizens and allies through cyber threats, coercion, privacy 
invasion, and intimidation without needing to resort to physical aggression. Through this 
nontraditional method, cyber actors exploit U.S. cyber systems, processes, and 
vulnerabilities to “gain economic, diplomatic, and military advantages.”255 Risks of 
escalated conflict and excessive militarization of the cyber domain could be mitigated 
through the development and agreement of standing norms, rules of conduct, and 
regulatory mechanisms for malign cyber activities. Collaboration is a key part of 
developing international governance, along with effective implementation, proper 
oversight, and defining roles and processes.  
The United States remains the preeminent target for malicious cyber activity, 
ranging from cyber-enabled economic espionage to cyberattacks targeting government and 
private-sector business interests. Aligning cyber operations with national policies and 
international processes is imperative. As part of its role as a global leader, the United States 
should lead policy development to establish international norms of behavior through 
established international institutions in the national security environment, to include the 
UN, the EU, and our Five Eyes (FVEY) partners (“FVEY” refers to an intelligence alliance 
comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States). 
A shift toward a dynamic, comprehensive international governing structure presents 
numerous potential challenges and responses leveraging a variety of mechanisms that could 
affect critical infrastructure, business interests, soft targets, and our allies. Determining a 
calculated response and defining regulation of cyberattacks will enable a whole-of-
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government, whole-of-cyberspace approach that harnesses the United States’ role in the 
global order to respond in a serious and meaningful way.  
Intense evaluation and discussion of the United States’ role in the cyber domain 
will enable sustainability in an ever-shifting terrain. Today’s adversaries conduct 
integrated attacks in multiple domains. International regulatory mechanisms can provide 
positive contributions to U.S. national security, cyber superiority, and adversarial 
accountability by facilitating cross-domain capabilities across the battlespace 
environments, which will provide critical commanders and decision makers the strategic 
information necessary to prevail in the cyber competition.256  
The United States’ deterrence efforts can intensify through persistent engagement 
and contesting adversaries to show dominance in cyberspace within the boundaries of 
international law, conduct, and norms.257 By responding under authorized circumstances, 
the United States could deter adversaries by a display of strength and intimidation, and 
contribute to diplomatic relations through faster, adaptable sanctions and communications. 
U.S. policy, influenced by and interconnected with cyber international laws, will enable 
the United States and its allies to be powerful, resilient, and push back against cyber threats, 
proving an equal or stronger playing field that may cause disruptions and a defensive shift 
for adversary operations.258  
An international regulatory process will increase response on the U.S. Homefront 
by eliminating several obstacles associated with the current approvals process, while 
maintaining civilian oversight. Quicker U.S. responses to malicious threats will provide 
adversaries with acknowledgement of a U.S. presence, knowledge of the threat, and 
dominance in the domain; it will possibly disrupt the malicious threats and deter future 
activity, including lessening the frequency of attacks; and it could have increased punitive 
consequences, such as levying sanctions, issuing indictments, and exposing individual and 
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state actors linked to cyberattacks. The faster the United States responds, the sooner it can 
issue an appropriate remedy. 
Cyber success can be based on resiliency, anticipation of vulnerabilities and threats, 
and defending forward to blunt adversarial action before it severely impacts U.S. networks 
and infrastructures. A combination of methods may be necessary to enable a stable 
cyberspace.  
Just as the cyber domain is constantly evolving, requiring technical adaptability, so 
too the international cyber community response needs to remain adaptive in its approach 
to governance and enforcement. No single platform or solution will address all criminal 
actors within the cyber domain. This complicated space warrants a multipronged approach 
for dispute resolution and remedies. The end goal, however, is to obtain the highest-level 
impact, the biggest-bang-for-buck: ideally, state-imposed remedies and compliance.  
Cyberspace is a complex and ambiguous arena that reaches across air, land, sea, 
and space battlespace domains. As domains grow, cyberattacks will continue to rise and 
evolve. The existing governance mechanisms may have kept the United States and 
international partners on pace or just behind its adversaries in the threat landscape. As the 
volume of data increases, so will vulnerabilities and criminal activity. It is important to 
push the governance discussion and debate now, rather than wait until adversarial 
capabilities and homeland vulnerabilities evolve so much that the regulatory discussion 
becomes more complex and burdensome to the international community. If the United 
States wants to be a dominant force in the cyber domain, it needs to drive and participate 
in governance dialogue to include international laws, lexicon, ROE, LOW threshold, 
conduct, norms, and roles within the cybersphere, as well as propose and assist in the 
development of mechanisms for regulation of non-state actors. A whole-of-government, 
whole-of-cyberspace approach should be considered when moving forward. 
As discussions continue to revolve around determining the best way to govern the 
cyber domain, there are several recommended courses of action that need to be developed, 
researched, and explored further.  
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A. COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 
Enforcement will be a challenging issue for cyber governance. Once a framework 
and governing mechanism is in place, a method for compliance and enforcement should be 
the final steps in the regulating process. Economic, political, diplomatic, military, and 
human rights factors should be considered when designing an international compliance and 
enforcement approach. Several questions should be considered for future exploration: 
• What measures should be included for compliance and enforcement of 
regulatory mechanisms for non-state cyber actors? 
• If mandatory cyber sanctions are issued, what would they look like, who or 
what entity issues them, and how would they be enforced?  
• Would multilateral or unilateral sanctions be more effective or would they 
be dependent on the actor and/or malign cyber activity? Unilateral 
sanctions, such as economic measures, may be argued to violate 
international law’s Rule Against Intervention—external interference in the 
internal affairs of a state. But in considering this issue in Tallinn 2.0’s Rule 
66, the IGE determines that such measures against cyber activities (e.g., 
prohibiting a state’s access to e-commerce websites), does not constitute a 
violation of the rule. However, the IGE notes that states must be mindful of 
any treaty and agreement obligations and determine: What would be 
considered a violation of the rule? 
• Sanctions can be controversial, costly, take time to be effective, and often 
fall short of the ultimate objective: holding a state accountable for activities 
and practices that are contrary to international law. Are there methods to 
achieve effective compliance through sanctions or alternative measures? If 
noncompliance is the result of a resource deficiency, for example, rather 
than disobedience, what measures could be adopted to provide technical or 
financial assistance to bring the noncomplying state up to code? 
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Overall, the compliance and enforcement process and procedures should be 
determined based on the proposed international regulatory mechanism and framework. 
B. THE UNITED STATES’ ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
MECHANISMS 
In consideration of the United States’ role in international governing mechanisms, 
several questions and areas of study should be explored to solidify the U.S. processes and 
role in support of international governance. The United States should: 
• Continue to lead international discussions with governments, international 
groups of experts, law enforcement, and the private sector for codification 
of cyber activities to align with international law with the caveat that new 
cyber-specific laws may need to be created to account for the breadth of 
cyberspace and the key players within (state, non-state, and proxy state 
actors). Frameworks and approaches, such as the ones considered in this 
thesis, should be evaluated and refined or redeveloped to provide a 
mechanism that is in the best interest of the whole-of-cyberspace. Legal 
authorities must be adequate to respond to cyber threats. 
• Play an integral role in providing clarity to international and domestic law 
enforcement roles in the cyber governance process.  
• Influence the redrawing of international law as it relates to the cyber 
domain’s evolution, thresholds for non-state activities, grounds for 
attribution, and other cyber concepts that do not fit perfectly into the current 
international law mold.  
• Develop national policies, structures, processes, and best practices across 
the U.S. federal government to align with international governance 
mechanisms. Oversight, transparency, and accountability should be 
addressed to afford our domestic and international partners, as well as 
civilians, a clear understanding of the United States’ regulatory capabilities 
and limitations.  
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National security classification guidelines concerning the cyber domain may 
present a challenge to some of these questions, such as cyber prosecution measures, 
particularly in regard to information sharing with international partners and publicly 
available information. As Tallinn 2.0 points out, most nation-states adopt classified cyber 
practices, so “publicly available expressions of opinion juris are sparse” providing 
difficulties in the definitive identification of truly cyber-specific customary international 
law.259 Cyber threats are long term, requiring the need to protect sensitive sources and 
methods, especially attribution. Classification should not be a deterrent to coordination and 
mitigation efforts.  
As the literature demonstrates, the United States is facing the beginning stages of a 
regulated cyber environment. Innovation, techniques, and processes are evolving. 
Governance approaches needs to be further discussed, defined, modified, or abandoned 
until a workable solution is found. The international community must determine the best 
approach to implement regulatory measures that will have effective, long-standing value 
across the cyber domain.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Non-state actors pose a challenging problem to cyberspace regulations. Cyber 
governance cannot be solely based on the concept of sovereignty, promoting state-by-state 
regulation. Cyber actions cross physical borders, evolve rapidly, and affect the 
international community’s critical infrastructure, states, cities, and localities. There are 
very few treaties for cyber activities and those that are in existence are of limited scope and 
applicability. The Tallinn 2.0 IGEs are unanimous in their estimations that cyber activities 
do not exist in a normative void and existing international law applies to cyber operations—
a sentiment shared or acknowledged by most nation-states and international organizations, 
including NATO and the UN Groups of Governmental Experts on Information Security.260 
Formal international governing mechanisms are critical for a unified response and global 
understanding of the space. Efforts need to involve coordinated partnerships that span 
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federal, state, and local levels in the United States, international states, the private sector, 
and academic subject matter experts to develop and implement effective governance.  
The United States is a key player in the cyber domain and needs to fully engage in 
governance discussions and development to ensure inclusion, intelligence and information 
sharing, transparency, and accountability. As demonstrated earlier in this thesis, non-state 
actors pose unique challenges regarding attribution and application of international laws. 
Focusing on nation-state and proxy-state actors alone will not wholly capture governance 
of the cyber threat. An international governing mechanism will impact global security and 
apropos U.S. homeland security by providing clarity on rules and regulation measures for 
mitigation and response to malign cyber actions by non-state actors.  
A secure border is a multilateral, shared effort; difficulties arise when the borders 
are complex and activity frequently travels across state boundaries. Now is a perfect time 
to further integrate international representation and cross-border cooperation to increase 
transparency, joint response, and efficiency in the cyber security effort. Central to 
partnership cooperation is border management strategies, and international governance 
mechanisms are the utmost border management strategies concerning cyber activities. 
During the next several years, it will be difficult to develop an overall solution as there can 
be “no cookie cutter approaches to developing border security strategies.”261   
A key lesson learned from this research is that the United States must continue to 
build and improve cooperation with our national and international partners, as disputes will 
not be resolved unilaterally. Absolute security against the threats and hazards the country 
faces is neither fiscally nor operationally possible. Instead, U.S. national security needs to 
be about managing national risk by “focusing on those actions and interventions that reduce 
the greatest amount of strategic risk to the Nation.”262 It must have a holistic, multi-lateral 
approach that can be found within effective international governance. The issue will not be 
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solved quickly yet the discussions must continue at full speed to head toward a resolution 
before the cyber space expands beyond the ability to regulate it.  
An effective, multi-pronged international governance approach will be a 
culmination of enhanced coordinated partnerships and collaborative efforts to provide 
critical oversight and response to criminal and terrorist activity within the rapidly 
expanding and evolving cyber problem space. A governance mechanism will provide 
homeland security benefits for the United States via operational approaches, augmented 
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